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BEYOND EINSTEIN AND EDISON: CLAIMING SPACE FOR 
NON-FACULTY INVENTORS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
JENNIFER CARTER-JOHNSON* 
ABSTRACT 
The Bayh-Dole Act, often credited with the explosion of university 
technology transfer, requires universities to incentivize invention disclosure by 
sharing the royalties generated by licensing. Many scholars have debated the 
effectiveness of university implementation of this requirement, and indeed, the 
low rate of disclosure of inventions by academic researchers to the university is 
often a bottleneck in technology transfer process. Unfortunately, most 
discussions focusing on inventor compliance with Bayh-Dole requirements have 
explored faculty-inventor motivations. Similarly, many university intellectual 
property (IP) policies are drafted specifically toward incentivizing faculty-
inventors to comply with invention disclosure requirements. However, in most 
cases, university inventions are joint products of a group of university members 
including not only faculty but also post-doctoral researchers or graduate students. 
This collaborative nature of scientific research seems to have been lost in the 
design of the technology transfer system. 
This Article contrasts the motivations and pressures of faculty with those of 
other members of the university research community, explores the conflicts that 
arise when faculty and non-faculty members are co-inventors, and explains why 
better incentives directed at non-faculty inventors could increase disclosure 
compliance. Furthermore, the Article explores the ways in which current 
university IP policies fail to address the issues surrounding non-faculty inventors 
and thus fail to fully incentivize invention disclosure by that group of university 
inventors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The lone scientist, toiling away over a Bunsen burner at midnight or huddled 
in the comer of his garage with a few tools, has long held a place in the American 
psyche. 1 As tempting as this noble image is, the truth is often much more 
mundane. Scientists typically work in groups, with ideas flowing among 
members in an often unaccounted for manner, each idea building on the one 
before. Thus, inventions often have multiple inventors, each responsible for a 
minor aspect of the final product. 
Thomas Edison, although best known for inventing the light bulb, did not 
work alone-his greatest invention may have been the research and development 
laboratory.2 At his Menlo Park and West Orange laboratories, he hired 
"muckers" to help perfect his ideas and develop new inventions.3 The 
collaboration with others worked well; Edison was a named inventor on 1093 
U.S. patents, as well as 500-600 unsuccessful patent applications.4 
This system of invention is the same model used in the laboratories of 
research universities, colleges, and non-profit research institutions across the 
country. 5 A faculty member, called a principal investigator, leads a research team 
composed of a mix of research scientists, post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, 
and technicians.6 These research teams are responsible for thousands of new 
inventions across the country each year.7 In order to commercialize these 
1. From mythologized versions of Thomas Edison's invention of the light bulb to the 
fictional mad scientist intent on ruling the world, the idea of scientists as lone inventors pervades 
the way Americans think about the inventive process. See, e.g., EvAN I. SCHWARTZ, THE LAST 
LONE INVENTOR: A TALE OF GENIUS, DECEIT, AND THE BIRTH OF TELEVISION 5-6 (2003) 
(containing Edison's obituary, calling Edison a "solitary genius" and a "lone Titan," and contrasting 
him with "the corporation research laboratory" "directed by a scientific captain"); DR. HORRIBLE'S 
SING-ALONG BLOG, http://www.drhorrible.com, archived at http://perma.cc/7EUA-43RQ (last 
visited May 21, 2014) (portraying a mad scientist intent on ruling the world by inventing 
transmitter/freeze/death rays). 
2. See generally THERESA M. COLLINS & LISA GITELMAN, THOMAS EDISON AND MODERN 
AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (2002). 
3. See id. at 16. 
4. For a complete list of and access to Edison's patents, see Edison's Patents, THE THOMAS 
EDISON PAPERS, http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm, archived at http:/ /perma.cc/DB8W -J2DM 
(last visited May 21, 2014). 
5. For brevity, ''university" as used in the remainder of the Article will include research 
colleges and non-profit research institutions. 
6. Even Albert Einstein, often characterized by his lack of social skills and wild hair, 
employed a series of research assistants. Many of those assistants, though generally unrecognized 
in the development of Einstein's theories, went on to become successful scientists in their own 
right. For example, Peter Bergmann was a post doctoral research assistant for Albert Einstein who 
was later help found the field of quantum gravity. Paul Halpern, Peter Bergmann: The Education 
of a Physicist, 7 PHYSICS IN PERSPECTIVE 390, 390 (2005). 
7. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT OF UNIVERSITY 
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inventions, universities often work with commercial entities to provide a means 
for the further development of the university inventions in a process called 
technology transfer.8 
Technology transfer is a complicated dance involving numerous players and 
varied influences. Many universities have created technology transfer offices 
(TTOs) tasked with choreographing and expediting this process.9 During the last 
three decades, technology transfer has become an economic powerhouse, and 
universities have become essential partners with industry, supplying innovative 
ideas and ground-breaking concepts-and often, patented inventions. 10 
Technology transfer from 188 surveyed universities produced $2.5 billion in 
royalties from licensing academic research innovations in 2008, likely 
representing fifty to seventy billion dollars in commercialized products. 11 
Even in the midst of such economic success, relatively few technologies are 
responsible for much of the income to universities, and according to some studies 
only about 50% of inventions are disclosed to the TTOs for licensing 
consideration. 12 To understand the reasons for the lack of disclosure, we need to 
look to the research team described above. Social norms, lack of education about 
technology transfer, and improper incentives have all been described as reasons 
for lack of disclosure. 13 However, analyses of these problems have, to date, 
focused mainly on the duties and attitudes of the faculty principal 
investigator-in large part because the majority of incentives are directed to 
faculty inventors. 14 Because graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other 
non-faculty researchers are also inventors, their role in the technology transfer 
process should not be overlooked. In fact, the lack of disclosure incentives and 
education directed at non-faculty inventors may be a large inefficiency in the 
university technology transfer process. Compounding the failures of university 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LESSONS FROM A GENERATION OF EXPERIENCE, RESEARCH, AND 
DIALOGUE: MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 20 
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2010). 
8. For the purposes of this Article, "technology transfer" is the process by which innovations 
from university researchers are licensed or otherwise conveyed to entities that will eventually 
commercialize the innovation. The Association of University Technology Managers defines 
technology transfer as "the process of developing and commercializing scientific findings and 
fundamental discoveries into relevant applications." Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM 
U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2008, at 7 (Rich Korda) et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter 
AUTM FY2008], available at http://www.autm.net/FY _ 2008 _Licensing_Activity_ Survey/ 
8916.htm. 
9. !d. 
10. Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University 
Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 59 (2001) [hereinafter 
Thursby et al., Objectives]. 
11. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 8, at 3. 
12. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
14. !d. 
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policies, conflicts between faculty and non-faculty inventors are not uncommon, 15 
potentially resulting in many non-faculty inventors deciding to opt out of the 
technology transfer system rather than face such conflict. 
In light of this complexity of research and invention in the university setting, 
the recent Kauffman Foundation proposal is particularly perplexing. 16 That 
proposal vests control of inventions created in the university laboratories to the 
faculty inventor. 17 Robert E. Litan, vice president for research and policy at the 
Kauffman Foundation, characterizes the proposal as "[o]ne simple amendment 
to the Bayh-Dole Act [that] would allow faculty members to choose their own 
licensing agents/experts and bring these discoveries to market quickly."18 While 
the relative efficiency of technology transfer by the university TTO versus a 
faculty inventor is debatable, the proposal fails to analyze, or even mention, the 
potential for conflict between the different types of inventors. 19 
This Article puts forth the idea that universities often overlook one very 
important group of university inventors-the non-faculty inventors, including 
graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and technicians. Part I overviews 
university technology transfer history and process. Part II describes the research 
into the effectiveness of various incentives for disclosure. Part III introduces the 
idea that there are special problems with universities' implementation of the 
Bayh-Dole Act when inventors are not faculty and analyzes recent Bayh-Dole 
reform proposals to determine if they address incentives directed at this group. 
Part IV concludes that the problem is not with the Bayh-Dole Act itself, but with 
university policies based thereon, and offers a few modest proposals for 
universities to consider when developing or revising intellectual property policies 
and procedures. 
l. RISE OF THE BA YH-DOLE ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Scientific research is at heart a speculative venture. Obviously, great 
advancements have developed through scientific research, but the monetary cost 
is high. Basic scientific research often has no direct consumer application and 
simply contributes to base knowledge that can be built upon in future works and 
innovations.20 Much of this basic research is funded through government grants 
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 32. 
16. Robert E. Litan & Lesa Mitchell, A Faster Path from Lab to Market, Jan.-Feb. HARV. 
Bus. REV. 52 (2010). 
17. /d. 
18. Kauffman Foundation Experts' Solution for University Technology Licensing Reform 
Named to List of 'Ten Breakthrough Ideas for 20 I 0' by Harvard Business Review, PR NEWS WIRE 
(Dec. 17,201 0), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releaseslkauffinan-foundation-experts-solution-
for-university-technology-licensing-reform-named-to-list-of-ten-breakthrough-ideas-for-20 1 0-by-
harvard-business-review-79556367 .html, archived at http://perma.cc/5K9F -NMQY. 
19. /d. 
20. As used in this Article, "basic scientific research" is that research designed to improve 
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and performed at universities. 21 Because of this high cost to the tax -paying public 
and lack of obvious, immediate application for the research, recent decades have 
seen a push toward rapid commercialization of basic research by means of 
technology transfer. 22 
A. A Short History 
The rationale most commonly referred to for the existence of patent rights is 
the encouragement of invention and concomitant disclosure to the public, argued 
to be most efficiently done by giving the inventor patent rights to the invention 
in exchange for disclosure. 23 Prior to 1980, however, federally funded academic 
research did not reward either inventors or the universities with ownership of 
these patent rights.24 No uniform federal policy existed defining the ownership 
of innovations resulting from federally funded research, 25 and the presumption of 
many funding agencies was that ownership of such innovations belonged with the 
funding agency itself.26 For researchers using federal funds, this resulted in an 
apparent lack of incentives to innovate or disclose any innovations?7 Many in 
Congress felt that innovations from basic research were therefore being vastly 
under-utilized, resulting in a "technology gap" against other countries.28 The 
Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980, was designed to correct this inefficiency in part 
through creating incentives to drive the commercialization of academic 
understanding of fundamental principles, relationships, and workings of the natural world. The 
main goal of basic scientific research is understanding, rather than the creation of a commercial 
product. 
21. "The federal government provided 59% ($32.6 billion) of the $54.9 billion of academic 
spending on S&E R&D in FY 2009." National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 
2012, available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c5/c5h.htm (last visited May 21, 2014). 
22. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 49-72 (2005); see also Part I.A. 
23. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing, 23 OXFORD REv. ECON. 
PoL'Y 620, 623 (2007) [hereinafter Thursby & Thursby, University Licensing]. 
24. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 16. 
25. See, e.g., John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must be 
Expected-More Must Be Done, 10 MINN. J. L. & SCI. 143, 146 (2009) ("Prior to the passage of the 
Act, there were twenty-six different federal agency policies about using the results of federally 
funded research."). 
26. See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: 
The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 REs. PoL'Y 772, 776-77 (2006). 
27. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 17. 
28. See, e.g., id. at 38 ("Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Do1e Act, the United States 
government held over 30,000 patents, but ofthose only 5% were licensed out to private industry."); 
Birch Bayh eta!., Universities, Inventors and the Bayh-Dole Act, 3 LIFE SCI. L. & IND. RPT. 1266 
(2009), available at http:/ /webcache.googleusercontent.com/search ?q=cache:http:/ /b-d30.org/app/ 
webroot/doc/Life _Sciences_ Inventors_ universities _and_ Bayh-Dole.pdf(last visited Apr. 30, 2011 ). 
But cf Sampat, supra note 26, at 779-80. 
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innovations. 29 
The Bayh-Dole Act provides a uniform federal patent policy for agencies that 
fund research by entities such as universities.30 The stated policy of the Bayh-
Dole Act is to "promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development" and to promote university and industry 
collaboration, particularly with small businesses.31 To promote the 
commercialization of inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act gives universities the right 
to "elect to retain title to any subject invention" and commercialize those 
inventions through licensing.32 Through this process, the Bayh-Dole Act 
incentivizes universities to commercialize inventions by allowing them to retain 
much of licensing royalties. The Bayh-Dole Act also attempts to incentivize the 
inventors by requiring that universities share those royalties obtained from the 
licensing.33 
Some commentators have praised the Bayh-Dole Act for providing an 
efficient and effective framework for technology transfer that produced 
considerable benefits for the public, private industry, and universities.34 The 
Bayh-Dole Act has been famously described as "[p ]ossibly the most inspired 
piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century."35 The 
growth of the academic technology transfer industry seems to bear out this 
assertion. 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 created, or at least coincided with, 
impressive acceleration in academic technology transfer. In 1980, there were 
only about two dozen technology transfer offices (TTOs) at universities and other 
research institutions across the U.S., but today almost every major research 
institution has a TT0.36 The Association of University Technology Managers' 
survey of 179 technology transfer offices in 2009 revealed that the offices 
executed more than5300 licenses and filed 12,109 new patent applications. 37 This 
29. Bayh-Dole Act ofDec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019-29 (codified 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2006)). For a full description of the history leading up to the 
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. 
REv. 1663, 1671-95 (1996). 
30. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 16. 
31. 35 u.s.c. § 200 (2006). 
32. /d. § 202(a). 
33. /d. § 202(c)(7)(B). 
34. See, e.g., Rebecca Zacks, TR University Research Scorecard, TECH. REv., July-Aug 
2000, at 88, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/business/12577/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EU6L-U8WU (last visited May 21, 2014). 
35. Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www. 
econornist.corn/node/14 76653, archived at http://perma.cc/J7W -ZDEP. 
36. See Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship From the Ivory Tower: Do Incentive 
Systems Matter?, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 353,353 (2004). 
37. See Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: 
FY2009, at 25, 34 (Rich Korda! et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter AUTM FY2009]. 
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same survey revealed gross licensing revenues of approximately 2.3 billion 
dollars in 2009, as opposed to a similar survey conducted nine years previously 
that demonstrated about a billion dollars of total licensing revenue. 38 
However, in recent years a number of authors have suggested that the benefits 
attributed to the Bayh-Dole Act may be overstated.39 Furthermore, these authors 
often contend that the framework developed by the Bayh-Dole Act produces 
economic inefficiencies and damages the basic research primarily funded by the 
federal govemment.40 
B. The Technology Transfer Process Involves Complex Interactions 
1. Process Overview.-Operating in the shadow of the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
academic technology transfer process consists of three main categories of parties 
involved: university researchers/inventors, the university itself, and private 
industry. Each party has a distinct, yet interdependent, role in the technology 
transfer process. 
The technology transfer process begins in the university research laboratory, 
which itself has a large cast of players. Faculty researchers who manage and 
direct laboratories are often termed "principal investigators" and are the lead 
scientists or engineers for their research group or laboratory.41 Principle 
38. /d. at 37. 
39. See, e.g., Sampat, supra note 26, at 783-84. For an overview of the debate, see Charles 
R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and 
Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Research to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION (F. SCOTT KlEFF & Troy A. Paredes eds. 2012). 
40. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1666 (arguing that 
the structure of technology transfer encouraged by the Bayh-Dole Act requires that the public pay 
twice for each innovation); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University 
Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOWGYTRANSFER: PROCESS, 
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary Libecap ed. 2005) [hereinafter Strandburg, 
Curiosity-Driven Research] (examining potential alterations ofbasic research driven by university 
technology transfer). But cf McManis & Noh, supra note 39. 
41. See Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction Between the University and Its 
Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent Infringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 
V AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473,478-80 (2010); Principal Investigator, WASHINGTONUNIV. INST. 
LOUIS OFFICE OF THE VICE CHANCELWR FOR RES., http://research.wustl.edu/Resources/Roles/ 
Pages/PI.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/GPL4-4XM6 (last visited May 21, 20 14) ("The Principal 
Investigator (PI) is charged to conduct objective research that generates independent, high quality, 
and reproducible results. The Principal Investigator is responsible for the management and 
integrity of the design, conduct, and reporting of the research project and for managing, monitoring, 
and ensuring the integrity of any collaborative relationships. Additionally, the Principal 
Investigator is responsible for the direction and oversight of compliance, financial, personnel, and 
other related aspects of the research project and for coordination with school, department, and 
central administration personnel to assure research in is conducted in accordance with Federal 
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investigators are ultimately responsible for the management of the laboratory and 
the proper use of any grant funding. Research associates often have a terminal 
degree and may be considered non-tenure track faculty.42 While working under 
the principal investigator, research associates often direct nearly-independent 
research projects within the laboratory.43 Post-doctoral fellows are most often 
recent terminal degree recipients. Like research associates, they often direct their 
own research projects, though generally in a slightly less independent manner.44 
Students within a research group or laboratory are generally investigating an 
aspect of the principal investigator's larger project and tend to be much less 
independent than the positions described above.45 Student researchers may be 
pursuing undergraduate or graduate degrees, and their research within the 
laboratory is used by the graduate student to create a thesis in addition to any 
publications produced.46 Finally, many research groups employ one or more 
research technicians who often perform general laboratory maintenance and 
administrative tasks and may conduct scientific research under the direction of 
others within the laboratory.47 
Once a principle investigator receives funding and begins oversight of a 
resulting project, work within that project may produce inventions that the 
academic researcher as the inventor must recognize as potentially having a 
commercial market. Upon such recognition, the inventor has a duty to disclose 
the invention to the university's TT0.48 Generally, the inventor is required to fill 
out a disclosure form providing basic information about the invention, relevant 
regulations and University and sponsoring agency policies and procedures."). 
42. See Excellence in Graduate Education, Aruz. STATE UNN., http:/ /graduate.asu.edu/grow/ 
pff/faqs, archived at http://perma.cc/3CQL-EM48 (last visited May 21, 20 14) (describing how the 
terminal degree (i.e., Ph.D.) is the highest degree awarded in most scientific fields). 
43. See Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 4 79 (describing how research assistants direct their 
own research within the laboratory). 
44. !d. 
45. !d. 
46. See id. at 480 (describing how "a mix of academic researchers" work for the principle 
investigator). 
47. See The Graduate School-Policies and Procedures, MONT. STATE UNIV., http://www. 
montana.edu/wwwdg/cat_grad_assist.htrnl#gra, archived at http://perma.ccN5WB-L6D2 (last 
visited May 21, 20 14) (describing how graduate research assistants use research projects to create 
a thesis). 
48. See Intellectual Property Policy, WASHINGTON UNN. IN ST. LOUIS, http://wustl.edu/ 
policies/intelprop.html, archived at http://perrna.cc/BPX4-8ZBW (last visited May 21, 2014) 
[hereinafter Wash U IP Policy] (describing an invention disclosure as: "Typically used to describe 
a formal (written) description of an Invention that is confidentially made by the Inventor to his/her 
employer. At Washington University an Invention Disclosure should be an enabling one, should 
include details as to co-inventors and funding sources and should be sent to the Office of 
Technology Management by an Inventor. Such a Disclosure is the 'first alert' to the University that 
an Invention has been made."). 
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funding, and inventors.49 
Once the TTO receives the disclosure, it then begins a decision-making 
process to determine if the invention is one that can be patented and licensed.50 
The TTO often conducts market analysis to determine demand and patentability 
searches to determine the likelihood of receiving intellectual property 
protection.51 Alternatively, the TTO often relies on the inventor to determine 
whether the product can be commercialized in various ways, including 
discussions of marketability, licensing partners or technical feasibility. 52 
Once the TTO determines that patent protection is appropriate, it then 
attempts to license the invention, generally to private industry entities for further 
development into a commercial product. 53 Licensing to industry at an early stage 
is desirable to the university since licensees often assume the costs of patent 
prosecution.54 Licensees often continue to rely on the inventor during the 
development of the final products due to the basic science nature of university 
research and technologies. 55 Alternatively, faculty inventors often create "spin-
out" companies to license and commercialize the very inventions the inventor 
disclosed to the university TT0.56 In such cases, the university may continue to 
pay the patent prosecution costs but take a financial stake in the spin-out 
49. There are two types of disclosure often mentioned in relation to university research: (I) 
disclosure by the inventor to the university and (2) disclosure by the university to the relevant 
governmental funding agency. For the purposes ofthis Article, "disclosure" will refer to disclosure 
by the inventor of an invention to the university TIO. For an example of a disclosure form and 
how disclosure is made, see Disclosing an Invention, UNN. OF CAL., http://www.ucop.edu/ 
ott/faculty/disclose.htrnl, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6JW-E3LK (last visited May 21, 20 14). 
50. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 8, at 10 ("Once the technology transfer office receives 
the innovations in the form of disclosures, it assesses each discloswe for commercial potential, 
novelty, potential for startup opportunity, and pre-existing obligations."). 
51. Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48. 
52. Anne C. Di Sante, The Role of the Inventor in the Technology Transfer Process, 
ipHandbook of Best Practices, available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch05/p05/ (last 
visited June 9, 2014 ); Stanford University's Office ofTechnology Licensing, OTL and the Inventor 
Roles in Technology Transfer, http:/ /otl.stanford.edulinventors/resources/inventors _ otlandinvent. 
html (last visited June 9, 2014). 
53. See Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 489 (describing how TIO's "coordinate patent 
applications, promote technologies, and negotiate licenses"). 
54. Wash U JP Policy, supra note 48 (describing how licensing agreements create income 
for the university). 
55. See Richard A. Jensen eta!., Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions: 'The Best 
We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work with,' 21 INT. J. INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003) 
(describing how it is estimated that 71% of the technology licensed from a university requires 
further development before commercialization). 
56. Commercialization via Start-up Company, THE FlA. STATE UNIV. OFFICE OF 
COMMERCIALIZATION, http:/ /www.research. fsu.edu/techtransfer/commercialization.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/MM26-X9PQ (last visited May 21, 2014). 
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company. 57 
Revenues from the licenses flow back to the university at many levels. Such 
revenues to the university can be viewed as returns on the taxpayer investment 
because the university uses part of the obtained licensing revenue to fund further 
research and other university educational and administrative functions. 58 A 
portion of the licensing revenue is also apportioned to the inventor as incentive 
to encourage invention and the disclosure of the invention to the university. 59 
Because invention disclosure by the researcher is an early step in the chain, 
inefficiencies at that point will propagate through the system. The failure of an 
inventor to disclose her invention means that the licensing process never begins, 
and the university never realizes revenues based on that invention. 
While this process seems very linear, it contains a number of feedback loops, 
making influences often hard to pick apart. For example, the private industry 
entities that may take licenses at the end stage often sponsor the initial research 
at universities or collaborate with university researchers.60 Such sponsored 
research agreements often include rights of first refusal for future licenses of any 
resultant inventions, and many corporate sponsors push for outright ownership 
of inventions produced under the sponsored research agreement.61 Many 
scholars, scientists and observers have expressed worry over whether such 
agreements influence the direction of university research today, shifting research 
from uncovering basic scientific truths needed to underpin technological 
advancements to more directly commercial work. 62 When the work to be 
accomplished is funded both by an industry sponsor as well as federal 
government grants and rights of first refusal are included in the sponsorship 
agreement, concerns should arise as to whether the public is receiving the proper 
amount of compensation for its investment in the initial research since the 
sponsor is able to negotiate the resulting license without any outside competition. 
Other problems in the technology transfer process arise when faculty 
57. Jeff Stewart, The Nanotech University Spinout Company: Strategies for Licensing, 
Developing, Commercializing, and Financing Nanotechnology, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 
365, 367 (2005). 
58. Elliot C. Kulakowski & Lynne U. Chronister, Research Administration and Management 
795 (1st ed. 2006), available at http://www.cs.unc.edu/-quigg/spring2013/Spring%202013% 
20Establishing%20a%20Spin-Oftll/o20Company.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FJ42-ENYR. 
59. See The Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (requiring non-profit organizations, 
such as universities, to share with the inventors some portion of the royalties obtained by the 
licensing offederally-funded inventions). 
60. Guidelines on University-Industry Relations, UNN. OF CAL., http://www.ucop.edu/ott/ 
faculty/disclose.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ AT7U-EH7M (last visited May 21, 20 14). 
61. /d. 
62. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNNERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2005). Cf John P. Walsh eta!., Where Excludability Matters: Material v. Intellectual 
Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 REs. PoL'Y 1184, 1188 (2007) (noting that 
commercial potential was important for only 8% of respondents as a reason for choosing a research 
project). 
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members blur the line between university and private research and fail to disclose 
inventions to the university but rather use inventions created in the university 
setting in the faculty member's independent company.63 John B. Fenn, a Yale 
University professor from 1967 to 1994 and a Nobel Laureate, was a co-inventor 
with two graduate students of a mass spectrometry technology.64 The inventors 
failed to disclose the invention to the university until ten months after publicly 
presenting the technology, leaving the university with only two months to elect 
to file for a patent, a deadline that Fenn noted in the disclosure.65 Fenn further 
informed the university that he believed there was little commercial value in the 
invention and that he had little time to assist in the production of any patent 
application.66 Based on the information provided by the faculty inventor, Yale 
elected not to pursue the patent.67 During these discussions, and without the 
knowledge of Yale University, Fenn filed for a patent on the invention and 
licensed the invention to a company in which he had a 49% stake.68 Eventually, 
after much litigation, the patent ownership and licensing revenue were awarded 
to Yale University.69 
2. Importance of Inventors hip to Universities.-Additional problems in the 
technology transfer process arise due to ambiguities in inventorship. Under U.S. 
patent law, ownership of a patent initially vests in the inventor. 70 Therefore, the 
naming of the inventor on a patent defines who can transfer the rights to the 
patented technologies. 71 As stated above, the Bayh-Dole Act gives universities 
the right to "elect to retain title to any subject invention."72 Until recently, many 
assumed this provision implied automatic vesting of ownership of federally 
funded inventions to the university rather than through assignment by the 
inventor. 73 This assumption was rejected recently in Stanford v. Roche. 74 
63. See, e.g., Fenn v. Yale Univ., 283 F. Supp. 2d 615, 621 (D. Conn. 2003), aff'd, 184 F. 
App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2006). 
64. Jd. at 620-25. 
65. Jd. at 625. 
66. Jd. at 625-26. 
67. Jd. at 626. 
68. Id. at 626-27. 
69. Id. at 640. 
70. See generally DONAlDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS ch. 2 (Matthew Bender 1978). 
71. See DONAlD S. CHISUM, AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011: ANALYSIS AND CROSS-
REFERENCES 42 (2011 ), available at http://www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/AIAOverview. 
pdf, archived at http:/ /penna.cc/5CNZ-7 AE6 (describing how previously only the inventor could 
file a patent application; however, section 4 of the America Invents Act provides that applications 
filed after September 16, 2012 may be filed by the inventor, the inventor's assignee or anyone to 
whom the inventor is obliged to assign the patent, even if the assignment has not yet been 
executed.). 
72. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
73. See, e.g., Joseph Friedm~ & Jonathan Silberman, University Technology Transfer: Do 
Incentives, Management, and Location Matter?, 28 J. TECH. TRANSFER 17, 18 (2003) ("The Bayh-
Dole act requires university's faculty members, students or staff members who recognize or 
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In Roche, Mark Holodniy, hired as a research fellow at Stanford University, 
had signed Stanford's "Copyright and Patent Agreement," obligating him to 
assign any inventions and related intellectual property to Stanford University.75 
To learn to perform a relatively new procedure, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), 
Holodniy made regular visits to Cetus, a biotechnology company that was later 
sold to Roche.76 Soon after his arrival at Cetus, Holodniy signed a "Visitor's 
Confidentiality Agreement" that provided that he "'will assign and do[ es] hereby 
assign' to Cetus the 'right, title and interest in each of the ideas, inventions and 
improvements"' that he developed "'as a consequence of [his]"' work at Cetus. 77 
After returning to Stanford, Holodniy went on to develop and assign to Stanford 
a PCR-based assay to detect HIV infection.78 
Years later, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement based on the 
Holodniy patents.79 Roche countered that Stanford did not own the patents 
because Holodniy' s Visitor's Confidentiality Agreement contained an assignment 
of the PCR-based invention because the assay was based on technology that 
Holodniy learned while at Cetus.80 The Federal Circuit agreed with Roche, 
noting that Stanford's prior Copyright and Patent Agreement merely held a 
contractual obligation to assign rather than an actual assignment. 81 Holodniy may 
have breached his contractual obligation to Stanford, but the first assignment of 
the technology went to Cetus. The Supreme Court held that the source of funding 
did not affect ownership of the resulting patent and that, even though the PCR 
assay was developed with federal funding under the Bayh-Dole Act, ownership 
rights continued to vest initially with the inventor. 82 Therefore, because Holodniy 
first assigned his patent rights to Cetus, he had no rights left to assign to Stanford. 
As a result of this holding, universities must acquire a valid patent assignment 
agreement in order to have the authority to transfer ownership rights. 
In light of the Roche decision, universities must rely on inventors to sign 
patent applications and assignments. Without inventor cooperation, the 
university cannot procure the needed patents or oversee the licensing of 
technologies created within its walls. 83 Additionally, if the TTO fails to list a co-
discover a new technology or invention that has commercialization potential to disclose the 
invention to their institution's Technology Transfer Office (ITO)."). 
74. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188 (2011). 




79. !d. at 2193. 
80. !d. 
81. See Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d. 
832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court in Roche, 131 S. Ct. 
2194. 
82. Roche, 131 S. Ct. at2195-99. 
83. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
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inventor on a patent and get an assignment, that co-inventor may later sue to 
claim her patent rights84 and potentially license those rights in competition with 
the university. 85 
Unfortunately, inventorship is a central and somewhat slippery concept in 
U.S. patent law, making it difficult for universities and inventors to comply. 
Under U.S. law, an inventor is a person who conceptually creates at least part of 
the invention as defined in the claims. 86 A patent usually contains multiple 
claims, each relating to a different aspect of the invention.87 Therefore, a patented 
invention can be, and often is, attributed to several inventors, each of which must 
have contributed conceptually to at least one of the claims in the patent. 88 
Joint inventorship has been defined as "the product of a collaboration 
between two or more persons working together to solve the problem addressed. "89 
However, it is not always easy to determine iftwo researchers are co-inventors. 
Multiple researchers can be co-inventors on a patent even if "(1) they did not 
physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type 
or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject 
matter of every claim of the patent."90 Inventors within universities may be any 
of the laboratory members mentioned in Part I.B .1-faculty researchers, research 
associates, post-doctoral fellows, students or staff conducting research. 
Due to the definition of inventorship and the complexities of the modem 
university research environment, inventions often include conceptual and creative 
contributions by many people building on an initial idea.91 Unfortunately, 
universities often leave the determination of inventorship, especially during the 
disclosure stage, to the researchers themselves.92 Because these researchers lack 
84. "[I]n the context of joint inventorship, each co-inventor presumptively owns a pro rata 
undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter what their respective contributions." Ethicon v. 
U.S. Surgical Court, 135 F.3d. 1456, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If a co-inventor is not initially named 
on the patent, the co-inventor may sue to have the patent inventorship information corrected. 35 
u.s.c. § 256 (2011). 
85. In the absence of an assignment agreement, the newly named co-inventor would be an 
owner of the patent and thus allowed to license the patent independently of the other co-inventors. 
35 u.s.c. § 262 (2006). 
86. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 40 F .3d. 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(explaining how "[c]onception is the touchstone ofinventorship"). 
87. Dennis Crouch, The Rising Size and Complexity of the Patent Document, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 2008-04, available at http://ssm.com/abstract= I 095810 
(last visited May 21, 2014). 
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining how "each joint inventor must generally contribute to the conception 
of the invention"). 
89. Burroughs Wei/come, 40 F.3d. at 1227. 
90. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2006). 
91. See id. § 116. 
92. See, e.g., Technology Transfer Policy, UNTV. OF MICH., http://www.techtransfer.umich. 
edu/resources/policies.php, archived at http://perma.cc/CJL2-GYFZ (last visited May 21, 20 14). 
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patent law training, their designation of co-inventors may be legally incorrect, 
resulting in improper patent prosecution and assignments.93 
In this set of simplistic examples, it is easy to see how inventorship of the 
same invention, a specialized antibody for a diagnostic assay, could be very 
different depending on the circumstances of its development. Each example 
results in a different set of inventors responsible for disclosure to the TTO and 
required to assign any patent rights to the university. 
In the first scenario, the principal investigator has an idea to make a special 
set of antibodies for use in an assay. The principle investigator tells a graduate 
student exactly what type of antibody to make, and the graduate student uses 
fairly common materials and techniques to create the antibodies. The principle 
investigator is likely the sole inventor because the principle investigator 
conceived of the specialized antibody and the graduate student carried out routine 
work at the principle investigator's direction to produce the antibody. 
In a second, slightly more complex scenario, the principal investigator again 
has an idea to make antibodies for use in an assay and tells the graduate student 
to do so. However, in this case, it is the graduate student who determines that a 
special type of antibody would be most effective and creates materials to make 
a specially directed antibody. Here, our principal investigator and the graduate 
student are likely co-inventors because both contributed conceptually to the final 
invention. 
Finally, in a fairly common scenario, the assay development is part of the 
graduate student's project, and it is the graduate student who recognizes the need 
to create the specialized antibody for the assay and plans how to make it. The 
graduate student goes to the principal investigator for approval to spend grant 
money and discusses the antibodies and the procedures for production. The 
principal investigator thinks it over and approves the project and expenses but 
makes no changes to the development plan. Here, the graduate student should be 
the sole inventor of the specialized antibody, but the principal investigator is 
likely to try to take some credit for the invention.94 
The Bayh-Dole Act created incentives for universities and researchers as 
inventors to engage in commercialization efforts. In many ways, these incentives 
have proven to be quite effective. The rise of the TTO at most major universities 
and the billions of dollars in licensing revenue underscore that success. The 
incentives might prove to be more successful if all inventors understood the 
incentives to which they were entitled. These incentives are necessary because 
the commercialization process has proven a costly endeavor in terms of both 
university and inventor resources. However, despite the diversity of people at all 
levels who may be innovating within the university, universities tend to take a 
blanket approach to incentivization of these inventors-usually focusing on 
93. See John Villasenor, Intellectual Property Awareness at Universities: Why Ignorance Is 
Not Bliss, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2012/ 
11127/intellectual-property-awareness-at-universities-why-ignorance-is-not-bliss/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X5Q5-ZRR2. 
94. See infra Part III.B for discussion of faculty disbelief of student inventorship. 
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faculty incentives. 
II. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO DISCLOSURE BY 
ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS 
659 
The framework of technology transfer developed by the Bayh-Dole Act and 
by universities' policies is completely reliant on the desire of the researchers as 
inventors to disclose patentable and licensable innovations.95 Any inefficiency 
at the disclosure stage is necessarily perpetuated throughout the technology 
transfer process. The duty to disclose and assign title to inventions is generally 
included in university policies to which universities require researchers to agree 
as a term ofemployment.96 Non-employee researchers, such as graduate students 
and sometimes even undergraduate students, are generally subject to similar 
policies in which the university claims title to any inventions developed using 
university resources.97 
Despite this duty to disclose no matter the source of funding, current evidence 
suggests that as many as 50% of patentable innovations are not being disclosed 
by researchers to their university's TT0.98 To many authors, this suggests an 
imbalance between incentives to disclose and other influences on researchers.99 
The disclosure incentive is generally monetary-a slice of the licensing revenues, 
as is required by the Bayh-Dole Act for federally funded inventions. 100 Some 
95. See Bayh-Dole Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019-29 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2006)); see, e.g., Technology Transfer Policy, supra note 92; 
James D. Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership ofFederallySponsored 
Research Patents, 49 IDEA 469 (2009). 
96. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 95; Technology Transfer Policy, supra note 92. 
97. See, e.g., Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48. There is debate as to the ability of the 
university to claim ownership of student-created inventions in certain contexts, such as inventions 
created during a class. This Article is limited to inventorship in the context of a university research 
laboratory, which typically means that the student is also acting in many ways as an employee of 
the university and using substantial university resources. For more information on the debate, see 
Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership Uncertainties to F aci/itate University-
Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REv. 367, 377-78, 383-84 (2009); Sean B. Seymore, My 
Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent? Inventors hip Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 
ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 137 (2006). 
98. See Jensen et al, supra note 55, at 1272; Jerry G. Thursby& Marie C. Thursby, Pros and 
Cons of Faculty Participation in Licensing, 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
INNOVATION AND ECON. GROWTH, UNIV. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECH. TRANSFER: PROCESS, 
DESIGN,ANDINTELL. PROP. 187, 189(GaryD. Libecap ed., 2005) [hereinafterThursby&Thursby, 
Pros and Cons]; Albert Link et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Propensity of Academics to 
Engage in Informal University Technology Transfer, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 641, 642-43 
(2007). 
99. See Thursby & Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98, at 189. 
100. See Bayh-Dole Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019-29 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2006)). 
660 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:645 
studies have found that monetary incentives to researchers in the form of royalty-
sharing or equity positively affect both innovation and licensing outcomes, 
though other factors act in opposition to monetary incentives. 101 
A. Monetary Disclosure Incentives 
University intellectual property policies generally provide for inventors, both 
faculty and non-faculty, to receive a share of the licensing revenue derived from 
their invention as incentive for disclosure. 102 Most policies from major research 
universities also reserve portions of the revenue for the academic department or 
college in which the inventor works, for the inventor's laboratory for future 
research funding, and sometimes for the TTO itself. 103 
The policies differ greatly on the percentage awarded to each party and 
whether those percentages are stable or change according to the amount of 
licensing revenue generated by the invention. At Washington University in St. 
Louis, for instance, all direct technology transfer expenses are subtracted from the 
gross licensing revenue, and the resulting net revenue is distributed as: 25% to the 
TTO, 35% to the creator(s), and 40% to the creator's school or college (which 
may further split this portion between the school, the department of the creator, 
and the creator's laboratory). 104 Michigan State University's policy is a staggered 
policy according to the amount of revenue. 105 The first $5000 of net revenue 
(gross revenue minus direct technology transfer costs) goes to the inventor, and 
the next $100,000 is split in thirds between the inventor(s), the inventor's college, 
and the university. 106 The next $400,000 is split with 30% going to the 
inventor(s), 40% to the university, and 30% to the inventor's college.107 These 
stages continue until net revenue is more than$1,005,000, at which time the split 
becomes 15% to the inventor(s), 15% to the inventor's college, and 70% to the 
101. See Thursby & Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98, at 192-93, 102. 
102. See Thursby et al., Objectives, supra note 10, at 61 (finding that the average research 
university in the author's study provides a 40% share of net license revenue to the inventor). For 
examples of revenue sharing for university inventors, see, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, JOHNS 
HOPKINSUNIV. § V.B., http://jhuresearch.jhu.edu/JHU _Intellectual_Property _Policy. pdf, archived 
at http:/ /perma.cc/CA4J-8PCN (last visited May 21, 20 14); Patent and Tangible Research Policy, 
N. C. STATE UNIV. § 8, http://www.ncsu.edu/projectlbotbook/public/2011/06/Patent-Policy-to-
BOT-7-2011_1.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/3WPV-3YWX (last visited May 21, 2014); 
Patents-Faculty Handbook, MICH. STATE UNIV. §VI, http://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/facacad 
handbooks/facultyhandbook/patents.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/CWG3-XP5Y (last visited 
May21, 2014). 
103. See, e.g. ,Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 1 02; Technology Transfer Policy, supra 
note 92. 
104. Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48. 
105. Patents-Faculty Handbook, supra note 102. 
106. Id. 
107. !d. 
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university. 108 In each case, these policies represent the individual university's 
estimation of the proper incentives for disclosure and, in some cases, further 
assistance with commercialization attempts for the invention. 
Some commentators have suggested that monetary incentives are less 
effective than other types of incentives in the academic research world. Daniel 
Greenberg states that "academic science is not heavily populated with wealth-
seeking individuals."109 Greenberg and others suggest that, through a process of 
self-selection, academic researchers are more interested in the secure employment 
of tenure, intellectual freedom, and recognition of their peers. 110 Siegel et al., 
describes the primary goal of research scientists as "recognition within the 
scientific community," with financial gain and securing research funding as 
secondary goals. 111 
The keys to attaining these non-monetary goals and interests are grant money 
for research and the subsequent stream · of resulting publications. 112 The 
underlying incentive for publication is different for each member of the research 
team. 113 While faculty researchers are often focused on publication for promotion 
and tenure, publications are equally important for post-doctoral researchers and 
graduate students. 114 Post-doctoral researchers rely on a demonstrated publication 
record to transition to a faculty or industry position. 115 Graduate students often 
have a publication requirement in order to obtain a Ph.D. 116 
This focus on publications and recognition suggests that incentives in the 
form of a personal share of licensing revenue may not be completely aligned with 
the primary motivations of academic researchers at any level. 117 This author has 
previously argued that monetary prizes for disclosure directed at funding research 
to further develop the new technology might be a better incentive to disclosure, 
as such prizes would directly impact the ability of the academic researcher to 
108. !d. 
109. DANIELS. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS AND DELUSIONS OF 
CAMPUS CAPITALISM 22 (2007). 
110. !d. at 22-23. See generally Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research, supra note 40, at 99-
104. But note that any proposed incentive models centered around these interests would not be 
particularly applicable to non-faculty researchers, such as students and post-doctoral researchers. 
See supra Part LB. I for an in-depth discussion. 
Ill. DonaldS. Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact of Organizational Practices on the Relative 
Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 REs. POL'Y 27, 
31 (2003) [hereinafter Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact]. 
112. Paul R. Sanberg et al., Changing the Academic Culture: Valuing Patents and 
Commercialization Toward Tenure and Career Advancement, 111 PROCEEDINGSOFTHENATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 6542, 6542-43 (20 14). 
113. See Seymore, supra note 97, at 130. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. Seeid. 
117. Carter-Johnson, supra note 41. 
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continue research. 118 Supporting the notion that personal monetary gain is not the 
best incentive, interview studies with faculty research scientists have uncovered 
a desire for alternative incentives for invention and disclosure, such as promotion 
and tenure consideration. 119 
A large number of scholarly articles have investigated, by use of empirical 
data and modeling, the effect of incentivizing faculty researchers through share 
of licensing revenue. 120 In general, these studies conclude that monetary 
incentives have at least some positive impact on eventual numbers oflicenses and 
gross licensing revenue. 121 As disclosure by the researchers to the TTO is the 
primary input into licensing numbers and revenue, 122 it can be extrapolated that 
these incentives also affect invention disclosure rates. 123 However, some studies 
have shown little or no positive impact of revenue sharing with researchers. A 
case study of eleven inventions from two major research universities found that 
potential financial incentives played no part in the decision to begin research 
projects. 124 Also, a survey of biomedical researchers found that only 8% of 
respondents described commercial potential as an important reason for choosing 
a research project. 125 Finally, incentivization of faculty researchers may also be 
unrelated to or actually damaging to entrepreneurial activities. Markman et al., 
118. Jd. 
119. Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact, supra note 111, at 42-43, 44 ("The vast majority of 
interviewees also specifically commented on the fact that tenure and promotion decisions continued 
to be made almost strictly on the basis of publications and grants" and "[o ]ne department chair 
phrased it as follows: It's the height of hypocrisy for universities to claim that they value 
technology transfer, or that it's supposed to be a top institutional priority, and then fail to reward 
it in their promotion and tenure decisions. At some point, we've got to resolve this discrepancy.") 
120. Almost no empirical data or model considers the effect of incentivization on non-faculty 
researchers. See infra Part III. 
121. See, e.g., Friedman & Silberman, note 73, at 29 (showing a positive but weak correlation 
oflicense revenue share incentives to faculty researchers with the number oflicenses executed and 
a strong correlation with license income. This discrepancy may be due to a skewing of the data by 
one or more "blockbuster" inventions or could also be due to limits on ITO resources to execute 
more licenses.); Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives and Invention in Universities, 39 
RAND J. EcoN. 403 (2008) (showing that license revenue sharing with scientists strongly affects 
licensing outcomes); Albert Link & Donald Siegel, Generating Science-Based Growth: An 
Economic Analysis of the Impact of Organizational Incentives on University-Industry Technology 
Transfer, 11 EUR. J. FIN. 169 (2005); Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact, supra note111; Thursby 
& Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98. 
122. See Friedman & Silberman, supra note 73, at 27, 29. 
123. Identifying true disclosure rates is problematic in that we can only positively know the 
numerator, i.e., the number of disclosures actually made by academic researchers. The 
denominator, i.e., the number of disclosures that should have been made is simply an informed 
estimate. 
124. Jeannette Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get into Practice?, 48 MGMT. 
SCI. 61 (2002). 
125. See Walsh et al., supra note 62, at 1188. 
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for instance, found that in a sample of 128 universities, the number of executed 
equity licenses (commonly used in licensing to spin-out entities) was actually 
negatively correlated with incentive pay to faculty researchers. 126 However, it is 
unclear if the decrease in equity licensing is related to any decrease in disclosure 
rates. 127 
B. Disincentives to Disclosure 
Arrayed against these monetary incentives to disclose are a number of 
pressures inherent in the academic research environment. University scientists 
work in a community that was built on the free sharing of ideas through 
publications, conferences, and open discussion. 128 The social norms surrounding 
this community have made it difficult to convince university scientists that 
participating in the technology transfer process is valuable. 129 Additionally, 
scientists lack education about technology transfer generally. Many scientists do 
not understand the legal definition of an invention or inventorship. Similarly, the 
scientist who has created a new invention may not be familiar with the steps 
required to disclose the invention to the TTO or the potential rewards of so 
disclosing. These problems with education also reflect a larger time management 
problem. Scientists have a finite amount of time and many university 
responsibilities that take priority. Taken together, these problems mean that 
university scientists often perceive little immediate value to compensate for the 
time and effort involved in disclosure. 
1. Social Norms in the Research Community Inhibit Disclosure.-Perhaps 
the most discussed and debated disincentive to disclosure is the conflict of 
academic technology transfer with scientific social norms. 130 Norms particular 
to academic researchers have been described by authors since at least the middle 
of the last century, and many of these norms appear at the surface to be 
126. Markman, supra note 36, at 359. 
127. One problem with studies such as these is that the situations examined are rather static. 
There is no way to experiment, i.e., alter variables and examine effects, and so many of the 
conclusions are at best speculative. 
128. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 90 (1999). 
129. See McManis & Noh, supra note 39; Thursby & Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98, 
at 189. 
130. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289-90 (2003) (discussing the erosion of"open 
science" norms resulting, at least in part, from the encouragement of university patenting of basic 
biomedical research); Rai, supra note 128, at 77 (discussing changes in scientific norms within the 
biotechnology research community); Thursby & Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98, at 189 
("[S]ome faculty may refuse to disclose for 'philosophical' reasons related to their notions of the 
proper role of academic scientists and engineers."). For a comprehensive discussion ofthe debate 
over the existence and effects of scientific norms on technology transfer, see McManis & Noh, 
supra note 39. 
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antithetical to the current academic technology transfer structure. The 
distinguished sociologist Robert Merton described four basic scientific norms: 
communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. 131 Of 
these, communalism, which is the idea that there is a common ownership of 
scientific discoveries, and disinterestedness, which is the idea that scientists 
should act in ways that are selfless, i.e., they should have no financial attachment 
to their research, are most applicable to discussions of incentives to disclose. 
Both of these ideals could obviously impact the desire of the academic researcher 
to comply with disclosure duties. 
The disinterestedness norm immediately conflicts with monetary 
incentivization of the researcher. The effectiveness of a monetary incentive 
inherently relies on a certain amount of self-interest and pride of ownership in the 
invention. Even indirect monetary grant incentives directed at the inventor's 
laboratory and further research in return for invention disclosures may be 
perceived as self- interested because the research money leads to publications that 
lead to prestige. While non-monetary incentives, such as tenure consideration for 
high-quality disclosures, may not conflict as directly with the financial aspects of 
this ideal, any type of disclosure incentive directed at the researcher's benefit 
indicates some degree of self-interest. 
Communalism would suggest that research results should be published and 
that these results should be freely usable to other researchers and the public. 132 
Communalism further suggests that the proper reward for scientific discovery is 
recognition and esteem. 133 These ideals of communalism could easily conflict 
with the patent monopoly and the exclusive licensing common in academic 
technology transfer. Scholars such as Katherine Strandburg have refined the 
communalism concept, applying it to specific situations within academic research 
and technology transfer. 134 Strandburg identifies the research norms of sharing 
research tools and materials, 135 as well as the preferences of academic researchers 
for "performing scientific research and participating in the scientific discourse" 
and "learning the results of the collective research project" as examples of 
communalism. 136 
Both of these norms conflict with academic technology transfer. Patents 
result in exclusivity rights, which may be used to restrict use of the innovation, 
and patent protection requires some secrecy on the part of the researcher. 137 
Under current U.S. patent law, publication of research more than a year before 
131. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (Norman W. Storer ed., Univ. of Chicago Press1973). 
132. Thursby & Thursby, University Licensing, supra note 23, at 623. 
133. /d. 
134. Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between 
Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2237 (2009) [hereinafter Strandburg, 
Community Norms]. 
135. /d. at 2248. 
136. /d. at 2249. 
137. 35 u.s.c. § 261 (2012); id. § 271. 
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application for a patent will bar the approval of the patent. 138 Other countries are 
considerably more stringent, having a publication bar in which any publication 
of the innovation before the patent application results in an immediate bar of 
patent approval. 139 Therefore, academic researchers may fear that disclosure of 
innovations to the university TTO will result in requirements to delay publication 
or conference presentations so that patent applications can be timely filed. 140 
Empirical evidence supports this trepidation on the part of academic 
researchers, demonstrating that almost 20% of disclosing researchers in the life 
sciences have experienced publication delays of greater than six months due to 
TTO patenting. 141 While this amount of time may seem minor, the consequences 
could be drastic. In some fast-moving fields such as molecular biology, a six-
month delay could easily be the difference between publishing the innovation in 
a premier journal as a pioneering work or in a lesser journal as merely a 
confirming work. 142 As indicated above, faculty academic researchers appear to 
place publication and tenure considerations above monetary considerations and 
so may strategically fail to disclose innovations in the face of publication delay 
fears. 143 
Violation of perceived norms can also have direct consequences for the 
academic researcher. 144 Many of the functions of academic researchers are 
dependent on the approval of peers. Tenure consideration is in large part 
dependent on local peer approval, 145 which can be damaged by perceived 
deviation from the social norms. Publication is also peer-reviewed, and while the 
reviewers are presumably anonymous to the author, the author's identity often is 
138. /d. § I 02(8). While the America Invents Act will considerably alter 35 U.S.C. §I 02, it 
retains an exemption that is likely to provide a similar one-year grace period for university 
inventors publishing or presenting their innovations before a patent application is submitted. 
America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(l). 
139. See generally /PR Help-Desk, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG ENTERPRISE, available at 
http://www. tecpar. br/appi/News/GracePeriodinventionLaw. pdf, archived at http ://perma.cc/5 2E6-
YJ4B (describing grace periods for publication, or the lack of the same, in Europe and other states). 
140. See, e.g., Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48 ("The publication of research results must not 
be hampered by agreements made to commercialize intellectual property. However, a minimal and 
defined delay to protect intellectual property through patent applications may be included."). 
141. See David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science, 277 
JAMA 1224 (1997). 
142. Thursby & Thursby, University Licensing, supra note 23, at 633. 
143. See also Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 483 ("[I]n spite of a government requirement 
to disclose government-funded inventions to the university for licensing and the university's 
considerable interest in licensing such inventions, academic researchers routinely publish their 
inventions in scientific journals without university disclosure rather than spending the extra time 
required to also disclose the inventions to the university."); Siegel eta!., Assessing the Impact, 
supra note Ill, at 31. 
144. See Strandburg, Community Norms, supra note 134, at 2249. 
145. In addition to the number and quality of publications, which may be diminished due to 
the publication delays previously discussed. 
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not. 146 Even in situations in which the authors' names are removed from a draft 
submitted for peer review, authors commonly work in extremely specialized 
fields and are thus fairly easy for an informed reviewer to identify. 147 Finally, 
grant proposals are also often a peer-reviewed process. In the case of federal 
grants through the National Institutes of Health, the identity and "track-record" 
of an applicant is an explicit factor in the review for approval. 148 Each of these 
areas, all critically important to the career of an academic researcher, are 
opportunities for the research community to punish those seen as deviating from 
the scientific norms. 
Some attitudes against technology transfer, perhaps formed in response to 
research norms, appear to be less well supported. As mentioned above, disclosure 
of an innovation to the university TTO is likely to result in the university 
obtaining a patent and exclusivity rights to the invention. This outcome could 
also be in conflict with university scientific research norms such as 
communalism, perhaps inhibiting some researchers from disclosing the 
innovation to the university. However, fears of patent right exclusivity impeding 
research at universities may be unfounded. In the case of patents on research 
tools, rights are rarely enforced against university researchers. 149 In fact, 
universities are rarely sued for patent infringement for any reason. 150 
Over the last three decades, the number of university patents has exploded, 
suggesting that university research communities have a greater acceptance of 
patenting research outputs. 151 Acceptance of these altering scientific norms is not 
universal, however. Different universities, even major research universities with 
hundreds of millions of dollars in federal research funding, may retain different 
146. Richard Snodgrass, Single- Versus Double-Blind Reviewing: An Analysis of the 
Literature, 35 SIGMOD Record 8, 8 (2006). As an example, the peer review policy of Nature, one 
of the leading scientific publications, can be found at http://www.nature.com/authors/policies/ 
peer_review.html (last visited May 21, 2014). 
147. Studies have shown that in double blinding studies where neither the reviewer nor the 
author is disclosed, the identity ofthe author remains unknown 53% to 79% ofthe time. Snodgrass, 
supra note 146, at Record 8, 15. 
148. See Peer Review Process, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL REs., 
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer _review __process.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
H8XH-CK74 (last visited May 21, 2014) (In listing the criteria and considerations that peer 
reviewers should use when evaluating a grant, the review process specifically examines the 
applicant researcher and asks "have they demonstrated an ongoing record of accomplishments that 
have advanced their field(s)?"). 
149. See Strandburg, Community Norms, supra note 134, at 2250; Walsh et al., supra note 62. 
150. Chris Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey 
of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REv. 295 (2007). 
151. Charles McManis and Sucheol Noh reported that, in 1980, twenty-five universities 
received 150 patents, and the numbers had grown to 150 universities receiving 1500 patents by 
1992. See McManis & Noh, supra note 39. By2009, 179 universities reported filing 12,109 new 
patent applications while receiving approximately20,000 invention disclosures that same year. See 
AUTM FY2009, supra note 37, at 22, 25. 
2014] BEYOND EINSTEIN AND EDISON 667 
cultures regarding exclusivity of basic research outputs, particularly research 
tools. Additionally, such cultures shift over time. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) is well known for its long history of successful technology 
transfer and faculty participation in commercialization of university 
innovations. 152 Other schools have become believers in technology transfer much 
more recently. In 1999 Johns Hopkins University President William Brody 
boasted about Hopkins' actions in putting revolutionary research tool technology 
into the public domain and avoiding pushing Hopkins' researchers into 
commercial activity. 153 By 2011, Johns Hopkins was ranked No.23 in the country 
in amount of licensing revenue by the Chronicle of Higher Education. 154 
It is, therefore, unclear what practical effect current scientific research norms 
have on disclosure of innovations to the university and subsequent patenting and 
commercialization. AUTM survey results indicate clear increases in gross 
numbers of invention disclosures, suggesting there is greater acceptance of 
university ownership of researcher innovations. 155 This suggests that social norm 
impediments to disclosure may be waning. 
2. Academic Researchers Often Fail to Disclose Due to Practical 
Limitations.-Aside from scientific norms, another pressure against disclosure 
may be a simple balancing of the time investment necessary for disclosure and the 
expectations of recoupment. For many academic researchers, this balancing of 
time commitments may weigh strongly in favor of failing to disclose. Once a 
faculty researcher creates a new technology, she must determine the best use of 
the technology and her time in order to continue to receive more funding and job 
stability, such as tenure. Similarly, post-doctoral researchers and graduate 
students must make a trade-off between publication and its concomitant career 
advancement and the time needed for disclosure. 
While an invention disclosure may result in monetary gain in the distant 
future, an academic researcher at any level may decide that publication or further 
grant writing is a better use of her time than filing an invention disclosure. 156 
Academic researchers routinely publish their inventions in scientific journals 
152. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 109, at 57-58 ("At MIT and several other universities 
with long experience in commercializing research, matchmaking between campus and corporation 
is carefully organized and systematically pursued."); Shirl M. Reznitz et al., University 
Commercialization Strategies in the Development ofRegional Bioclusters, 25 J. PROD. INNOVATION 
MGMT. 129, 135 (2008) ("MIT as a world-class educational institution has been very successful in 
fostering entrepreneurial approaches to technology transfer."). 
153. GREENBERG, supra note 109, at 58. ("Hopkins president William Brody asserted that 
'our scientists are by nature explorers .... Asking them to become managers, marketers, and 
accountants is unrealistic and ultimately inimical to the research enterprise."'). 
154. Universities with the Most Licensing Revenue: 2011, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., 
available at http://chronicle.com/article/Sortab1e-Table-Universities/133964/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/Q2RU-5WTA (last visited May 21, 2014). 
155. See AUTM FY2009, supra note 37, at 22. 
156. For a more in-depth discussion of the motivations of academic researchers, see Carter-
Johnson, supra note 41. 
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without university disclosure rather than spending the extra time required to also 
disclose the inventions to the university. 157 These academic researchers make the 
decision to forego disclosure in spite of near universal contractual requirements 
to disclose inventions to the university for licensing and the university's 
considerable interest in licensing such inventions. 158 
The choice to forego invention disclosures may be due to the perception by 
many academic researchers that no direct monetary benefit will be forthcoming. 
Such a perception is likely to be correct. Survey data has indicated that a 
minority of researchers who have disclosed and received a patent actually see any 
licensing revenues. 159 A study of academic biomedical researchers found that 
only 18% of the polled researchers received income from licensing. 160 
These studies align with recent AUTM data indicating that university 
inventors filed 20,309 new invention disclosures in 2009. 161 In contrast, only 
12,109 patent applications were filed in that year-approximately 60% of the 
number of invention disclosures. 162 From a licensing standpoint the numbers are 
even less enticing. Only 6889 disclosures were licensed in 2009, a number 
approximately 34% of the invention disclosures. 163 Assuming the number of 
2008 disclosures licensed in 2009 and the number of 2009 disclosures licensed 
in 2010 stayed relatively similar, the possibility that a new invention will yield 
a large return is fairly slim. With such data, researchers would understand that 
only a minority of invention disclosures will result in revenue generation for 
themselves. 
Even if the invention disclosure is licensed, the vast majority of academic 
innovations that are licensed generate relatively little revenue. Of the 33,523 
157. Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 
63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007); Jensen et al., supra note 55, at 1272. 
158. See, e.g., BCM Policies and Procedures, BAYLOR COLL. OF MED. § III, https://www 
. bcm.edu/research/office-of-research/bay lor-licensing-group/search/BAYLOR _PATENT_ 
POLICY.pdf(last visited May 21, 2014) ("Any College Personnel who has Developed any Baylor 
Intellectual Property as herein defined shall promptly complete the applicable Disclosure Form"); 
Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property, HARvARD UNIV., http://www.techtransfer. 
harvard.edu/resources/policiesllP/lPPolicy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TQA4-PLJA (last 
visited May 21, 2014) ("Covered persons are required to notifY the University's Office of 
Technology Development ('OTD') of each Supported Invention and Incidental Invention through 
a disclosure document as prescribed by OTD."); Patent Policy, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, 
http://www.spo.berkeley.edu/Policy/patentpolicy.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4F7X-MLD7 
(last visited May 21, 20 14) ("Those individuals who have so agreed to assign inventions and patents 
shall promptly report and fully disclose the conception and/or reduction to practice of potentially 
patentable inventions to the Office of Technology Transfer or authorized licensing office."). 
159. See Thursby & Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 98, at 190. 
160. See Walsh et al., supra note 62, at 1187. 
161. See, e.g., AUTM FY2009, supra note 37, at 13-14. 
162. /d. at 25. This author concedes that the number of patent applications and disclosures 
licensed is likely to include disclosures from 2008 and prior years as well. 
163. /d.at36. 
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active licenses in 2009, only 199licenses generated revenue greater than a million 
dollars. 164 A poll of academic biomedical researchers found that only about 5% 
had received total licensing revenues of more than $50,000. 165 Successful TTOs 
often have very few "blockbuster" licenses that make up the bulk of revenues, 
and as such, academic technology transfer often becomes a feast or famine 
situation. 166 
The low probability of income is not the only consideration inventors face 
when balancing time commitments. Most of the disclosed inventions are at 
"embryonic" stages and require considerable additional research and development 
before being ready for commercialization.167 Current evidence suggests that 
successful licensing ventures often require additional input from the inventing 
academic researcher, as this person is the most familiar with the innovation. 168 
Therefore, the savvy academic researcher will realize that the time invested is 
unlikely to produce substantial revenue, and even more time may be required if 
there is to be any successful licensing of the innovation at all. 
Compounding time pressures, a lack of education regarding technology 
transfer may be an important issue contributing to the disclosure problem. 
Academic researchers do not instinctively understand when a patentable invention 
has been created or even recognize the existence of the duty to disclose an 
invention. 169 To the extent the time pressures discussed above exist, academic 
researchers are unlikely to find time to educate themselves if they lack an 
underlying understanding of the importance of technology transfer. 
The extent of these education problems likely varies enormously between 
universities, based in large part on the outreach efforts of the university TTO and 
the social norms of the particular university. 170 Though not an active push against 
disclosure like those issues discussed above, ignorance ofthe academic researcher 
as to both duty to disclose and the researcher's ability to recognize disclosure-
worthy innovations may negatively affect disclosure rates and totally abrogate 
any incentive structure used to encourage disclosure. 171 
Finally, academic researchers may misunderstand the interaction between 
technology transfer and publication. The pressure to publish may force academic 
researchers to forego disclosure in favor of publication under the mistaken 
164. !d. at 37. 
165. See Walsh eta!., supra note 62, at 1187. 
166. See Maureen Farrell, Universities That Turn Research into Revenue, FORBES (Sept. 12 
2008), http://www .forbes.com/2008/09/ 12/ google-general-electric-ent-tech-cx _ mf_ 0912 
universitypatent.html, archived at http:/ /perma.cc/WMV3-YCRR; A UTM FY2009, supra note 3 7, 
at 37. 
167. See Thursby eta!., Objectives, supra note 10, at 62; Thursby & Thursby, University 
Licensing, supra note 23, at 625-26. 
168. See Thursby eta!., Objectives, supra note 10, at 62 ("71% of licensed inventions are 
viewed as requiring inventor cooperation for commercial success."). 
169. Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 24; Seymore, supra note 97, at 9. 
170. Tyler, supra note 25, at 174-79. 
171. Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 18-19. 
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assumption that the two choices are incompatible. 172 However, publication and 
university commercialization can and should co-exist. At least in the United 
States, publication is not a complete bar to obtaining a patent; rather publication 
triggers a one-year statutory window for filing a patent. 173 Coming changes in 
patent laws by the America Invents Act will largely leave in place a one-year 
grace period for filing after publications and presentations by the inventors. 174 
Ill. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR NON-FACULTY INvENTORS 
A flaw in current research on disclosure incentives is that the research tends 
to consider the academic inventors to be a monolithic block. Too often, scholarly 
articles have considered only faculty researchers in their analysis of 
incentivization impacts, and indeed, any other effects of technology transfer as 
well. 175 Specifically, these studies focus on how to best incentivize faculty 
inventors. 176 
The reality, however, is that large contingents of researchers in a university 
are students, post-doctoral researchers, research associates, and technicians. 177 
These researchers may also be inventors, either alone or as co-inventors with a 
faculty researcher. Authors investigating incentivization of academic researchers 
rarely consider situations in which multiple inventors are listed or how 
incentivization schemes may fail when the primary inventor is a member of a 
laboratory and working for the faculty inventor. Due to this lack of previous 
interest, no available empirical data concentrates on the incentivization of non-
faculty inventors. 
A. Importance of Non-F acuity Disclosure 
Due to the lack of research on incentives for non-faculty researchers, it is 
difficult to put a concrete number on the quantity of university inventions that 
faculty and non-faculty co-inventors create. However, it is clear that non-faculty 
inventors are listed on university patents, and lawsuits exist based on claims by 
graduate students and post-doctoral fellows who were excluded as inventors. 178 
Therefore, non-facultyresearchers are inventors in the university research system. 
These non-faculty inventors should be brought into the technology transfer 
system on a larger scale. 
Hollywood tends to portray the inventor as a lone genius toiling away by 
himself to create the next great innovation, but today' s reality is quite different. 
172. See supra Part II.B.1. 
173. 35 u.s.c. § 1 02(b )(2006). 
174. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 3,125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
175. See, e.g., Friedman & Silberman, supra note 73, at 20 (analyzing faculty incentives); 
Markman & Noh, supra note 36, at 354. 
176. !d. 
177. Seymore, supra note 97, at 5. 
178. !d. at 9-10. 
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Most modern research performed both in industry and in academia is done within 
collaborative research groups. 179 The members of these groups may make up part 
or all of a single laboratory or even multiple laboratories, and this situation often 
results in multiple inventors associated with a single invention. 180 
More than 70% of licenses from TTOs rely on disclosures from the life 
sciences fields. 181 Within a standard academic biomedical or life sciences 
laboratory, the faculty researcher, also known as the principal investigator, 
determines the overall research direction of the laboratory, develops a research 
team, and is ultimately responsible for obtaining funding for the laboratory. 182 
Principal investigators rarely perform experiments or are even involved in the 
day-to-day direction of a research project but are often involved in conceptual 
issues. 183 Research assistants, post-doctoral researchers, and graduate students 
most often conduct the day-to-day direction of discreet projects and 
experiments. 184 
Generally, post-doctoral fellows, research assistants, and technicians are 
considered employees of the university, working under the principle 
investigator. 185 Therefore, they would be subject to the same university 
intellectual property policies as the faculty researcher, including assignment of 
innovations developed with federal funding or university resources. 186 Students 
and graduate students are often required to agree to a similar or the same policy 
to work in the laboratory. 187 Therefore, all likely inventors would be under a duty 
179. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES &JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POUCY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1255 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2002); Seymore, supra note 97, at 130-32. 
180. Seymore, supra note 97, at 135. 
181. The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide to the Law and Implementing Regulations, UNJV. OF CAL. 
TECH. TRANSFER, http://www.ucop.edu/ott/faculty/bayh.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LFL-
7CU8 (last visited May 21, 20 14) [hereinafter The Bayh-Dole Act] ("70% ofthe active licenses of 
responding institutions are in the life sciences .... "). 
182. See Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 4 78-81. 
183. !d. at 478-79. 
184. !d. at 478-80. 
185. !d. at 479. 
186. See, e.g., Policy on Inventions, Patents, and Technology Transfer, DUKE UNN., 
http:/ /olv.duke.edu/lnventors/PoliciesAndProcedures/policy _on _inventions. pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8KBK-AS2Q (last visited May 21, 2014) ("Inventions resulting from research or 
other work conducted by university employees in whole or in part on university time or with 
significant use of university funds or facilities shall be considered the property of the university."); 
Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48 ("[A]ll intellectual property (including lab notebooks, cell lines, 
software, human samples, and other tangible research property) shall be owned by the University 
if significant University resources were used or if it is created pursuant to a research project funded 
through corporate, federal or other external sponsors administered by the University."). 
187. See, e.g., Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48 ("This Policy applies to faculty, staff 
(including student employees), graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and non-employees 
(including visiting faculty, affiliate and adjunct faculty, industrial personnel, fellows, etc.) who 
participate in research projects at Washington University."). 
672 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:645 
to assign inventions to the university. 
Building on the fact that laboratory research is a highly collaborative process 
and even in cases where post-doctoral fellows and graduate students have no 
conceptual input to the invention, they are still integral to the overall process. 188 
As the front-line laboratory workers directing the day-to-day workings of 
scientific projects, graduate students and post-doctoral fellows may in many cases 
be the most important link in the disclosure chain, recognizing and alerting the 
faculty researcher to potentially cornmercializable innovations. 189 However, in 
many cases, post-doctoral fellows and graduate students are adding conceptually 
and creatively to an inventive idea, making them at least co-inventors with the 
faculty researchers. 190 These determinations of inventorship are not easy for non-
patent attorneys. The discussion of some basic invention scenarios in Part I.B.2 
illustrates that inventorship may change based on the research path to creation. 
However, the inventive process is likely even more complex than those basic 
scenanos. 
Imagine a principle investigator in a laboratory who conceives of a new 
electric motor for a car, including schematics. That principle investigator then 
enlists a post-doctoral fellow to build a prototype of the new motor. Along the 
way, the post-doctoral fellow changes some of the motor specifications to comply 
with federal safety regulations. In addition, at weekly laboratory meetings during 
the course of final development, two graduate students make suggestions for 
added ventilation to the motor prototype resulting in increased efficiency. 
The inventors of the final invention disclosed to the TTO depend on the 
claims of the final patent and the level of contribution of each potential co-
inventor.191 While the changes in specification may have been necessary to 
comply with regulations, if the changes were routine or done under the direction 
of the principle investigator, the post-doctoral fellow's contributions may not rise 
to the level of conception. 192 However, post-doctoral fellows often work 
independently, and the changes in specification could have altered fundamental 
aspects of the motor; in such a case, the post-doctoral fellow might well be 
considered a co-inventor of at least some of the claims containing his updated 
specifications. 193 While the added ventilation may increase efficiency, the main 
claims may be directed toward the basic electric motor while the added 
ventilation may only need to be described in one or two very narrow claims. If 
the added ventilation is included in even one claim, the graduate student with 
whom that ventilation originated could be listed as a co-inventor on the patent. 194 
Importantly, co-inventors of even one claim would have equal co-ownership of 
188. Seymore, supra note 97, at 136. 
189. See id. at 146-47 (giving an example of a post-doctoral researcher disclosing an 
innovation to a faculty researcher). 
190. /d. at 136. 
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the entire patent with the principle investigator. 195 
Therefore, universities must understand the identity of the inventors if the 
TTO is to receive complete assignments ofthe patent rights. As discussed above, 
ownership of all inventions, even federally funded inventions subject to the Bayh-
Dole Act, initially vest with the inventors and must be assigned to the 
university. 196 Additionally, universities may be subject to substantial liability if 
an inventor, such as a graduate student, is intentionally excluded from a patent. 197 
This necessity to correctly label inventors, along with the problems with 
faculty disclosure to the TTOs, should lead universities to consider increasing the 
involvement of non-faculty inventors into the technology transfer process. As 
discussed above, graduate students and post-doctoral fellows employed in 
university research laboratories are under the same duties of disclosure as their 
faculty-inventor counterparts. 198 
To the extent that TTOs shape monetary incentives for disclosure, graduate 
student researchers are likely to respond to such incentives due to relatively low 
salaries for the work completed. 199 A graduate student in the sciences will work 
in a laboratory full-time for a principle investigator to gather research to write 
dissertations.200 Stipends for such research are set based on the grant funding 
mechanism. 201 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the most common 
funding agency in medical sciences.202 The 2012 NIH stipend level for full-time 
195. /d. 
196. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188, 2195-99 (2011). 
197. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 71, §§ 2.03(4)(e), 2.04(4)(a). The new America Invents 
Act removes the requirement that the inventorship mistake arose through "no deceptive intention" 
to correct inventorship of an issued patent. DonaldS. Chisum, America Invents Act Analysis and 
Cross-References 124, http:/ /www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/ AlAOverview.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WJ5S-9YZX (last visited May 21, 20 14). Therefore, universities may have less 
risk of patent invalidity due to intentionally ignoring non-faculty inventors. However, challenges 
based on fiduciary duties of the principle investigators may still be possible. · 
198. See The Bayh-Dole· Act, supra note 181. 
199. See, e.g., Why You Shouldn't Pursue a PhD, THE PRINCETON REVIEW, http://www. 
princetonreview.com/grad/why-you-shouldnt-pursue-a-phd.aspx archived at http:/ /perma.cc/3 82N-
ATGP (last visited May 21, 2014). 
200. See, e.g., Research Appointments-Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Programs and 
Policies 2013-2014, YALE UNIV., http://www.yale.edu/printer/bulletinlhtmlfiles/grad/financing-
graduate-school.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5JQF -GNSC (last visited May 21, 2014 ). 
20 I. See, e.g., Funding Mechanisms Supported by NEI, NAT'LEYE INST., http:/ /www.nei.nih. 
gov/funding/neifm.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/CET3-WCGE (last visited May 21, 2014); 
Grant Mechanisms and Funding Opportunities, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www. 
nimh.nih.gov/funding/grant-writing-and-application-process/grant-mechanisms-and-funding-
opportunities.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/446G-74TQ (last visited May 21, 2014). 
202. About NIH, NAT'LINST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about, archived at http://perma. 
cc/5G7Y-JT6V (last visited May 21, 2014). 
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graduate researchers was $22,032 per year.203 Other funding mechanisms pay 
approximately $30,000 per year.204 Postdoctoral fellows receive a slightly larger 
stipend, earning between $39,000 and $55,000 depending on funding mechanism 
and years of experience, and may also find monetary incentives valuable.205 
Non-monetary incentives might also influence graduate students and post-
doctoral fellows differently than faculty inventors. In most schools having one's 
name associated with a patent might be considered a bonus but will not likely 
contribute to tenure promotions.206 Showing an ability to develop a patentable 
product might prove useful to a non-faculty inventor whose career trajectory 
involves industry rather than academia. 
Unfortunately, while graduate students and post-doctoral fellows contribute 
richly to the intellectual life of the university and the creation of new inventions, 
little to no research has been directed to motivations of non-faculty inventors. It 
is possible that monetary incentives and non-monetary outreach directed at non-
faculty researchers might pay benefits to technology transfer as a whole. 
However, non-faculty inventors face obstacles to full involvement in the 
technology transfer aspects of university research. 
B. Academic Research Structure Often Fails to Recognize the Contribution of 
Non-Faculty Researchers to the Inventive Endeavor 
In light of the importance of non-faculty researchers to technology transfer 
process as inventors both in creating new technologies and aiding patent 
procurement and transfer, universities should be embracing these researchers and 
ushering them into the technology transfer proceedings. In fact, the opposite 
seems to be true. From the top of the administrative policies to the bottom of the 
nitty-gritty laboratory work, policies provide incentives solely aimed at faculty 
203. Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (NRSA) Stipends, Tuition/Fees and 
Other Budgetary Levels Effective for Fiscal Year 2012, NAT'LINST. OF HEALTH, http://grants.nih. 
gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT -OD-12-033 .html, archived at http://perma.cc/7NFV -NEK7 (last 
visited May21, 20 14) [hereinafter Ruth L. Kirschstein NRSA Stipends]. Undergraduates can expect 
to receive less than half this amount. 
204. The National Science Foundation's Graduate Research Fellowship pays $32,000. About 
the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship Program, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsfgrfp.org/ 
about_the_prograrn, archived at http://perma.cc/VV3B-F98Y (last visited May 21, 2014). The 
Department of Defense's National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowships pay 
$30,500 to $31,500 per year. National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowships: 
Stipends and Allowances, AM. Soc'YFORENG'GEouc., http://ndseg.asee.org/about_ ndseg/stipends 
_and_allowances, archived at http://perma.cc/S73V-HRPW (last visited May 21, 2014). 
205. NIH post-doctoral fellows earn $39,264 dollars in year one with increases up to $54,180 
in year seven. Ruth L. Kirschstein NRSA Stipends, supra note 203. NSF post-doctoral fellows 
similarly make $45,000 to $51,000 over the life of a three- year fellowship. 2012 Administrative 
Guide for the Postdoctoral Fellowships in Biology, NAT'L Sci. FoUND., www.nsf.gov/pubs/20 12/ 
nsfl2089/nsfl2089.pdf(last visited May 21, 2014). · 
206. Sanberg eta!., supra note 112, at 3544-46. 
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inventors.207 Within the laboratory, principle investigators, post-doctoral fellows, 
and graduate student researchers fail to recognize the importance and contribution 
of the non-faculty inventors. 
1. Faculty May Deny Co-lnventorship of Non-Faculty Researchers.-It is 
not uncommon for faculty researchers to deny that non-faculty inventors, 
particularly graduate and undergraduate students, have any inventive input in the 
laboratory.208 Some faculty researchers have blatantly made declarations to the 
United States Patent Office declaring themselves the sole inventor despite 
graduate student and post-doctoral researcher co-authors on the very papers at the 
base of the innovation. 209 While it seems extremely unlikely that a graduate 
student or post-doctoral researcher directing the day-to-day workings of a project 
would bring absolutely no conceptual creativity to any part of the claimed 
invention, this self-serving idea of sole inventorship appears all too common 
among faculty researchers.210 
Some scholars have perpetuated this idea, suggesting that graduate students 
require faculty advisors for research topics, implying a lack of conceptual 
creativity on the part of those students.211 Such a view fails to realize that 
advanced graduate students become faculty members in just a few years. 212 
This attitude of many faculty inventors causes real problems, as illustrated by 
Chou v. University ofChicago.213 Joany Chou worked for Dr. Bernard Roizman 
as graduate research assistant and a post-doctoral fellow at the University of 
Chicago's Department of Molecular Genetics and Cell Biology.214 During her 
time in the laboratory, Dr. Chou disclosed an invention to Dr. Roizman.215 
Although Dr. Roizman filed a patent on the invention, he informed Dr. Chou that 
the invention had no commercial value and was not worth pursuing patent 
207. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 95, at 497. 
208. See Seymore, supra note 97, at 143. 
209. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F. 3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Seymore, supra note 
97, at 147. This author concedes that not every author listed on a scientific paper contributed to 
every aspect of the paper. Therefore, it is quite possible that an invention would not list every co-
author as an inventor. But it is also unlikely that an invention based on the work of several co-
authors is the sole and complete conception of only one person. 
210. CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BAITLING FOR CONTROL OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 183 (200 1) (quoting a faculty researcher describing inventorship in his 
laboratory: "I think there's rarely more than one inventor ... [I]f you wake up and you have an 
idea, that's the invention .... [The postdoctoral researchers] contribute to the work [around the 
idea], but they don't do any really innovative work [such as] contributing new concepts, [or] 
coming up with something that, in my lab, I haven't thought about.") 
211. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 95, at 508-09. 
212. See, e.g., id. at 497 (suggesting that graduate students need receive no incentives to invent 
beyond their yearly stipend, perhaps due to the idea that faculty members are the true inventors 
within the laboratory). 
213. 254 F. 3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
214. !d. at 1353. 
215. !d. 
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protection.216 Dr. Chou alleged that Dr. Roizman eventually fired her for pressing 
her claim as inventor on the patent upon uncovering its existence. 217 After 
leaving his laboratory, Dr. Chou sued Dr. Roizman, the University of Chicago, 
and ARCH Development Corporation, the University of Chicago's licensing arm, 
for correction of inventorship in order to have her name added to the patent as a 
co-inventor.218 The university technology transfer policy provided for inventors 
to receive twenty-five of the revenue from a patent license, as well as stock in any 
company based on the patented technology. 219 As a co-inventor, Dr. Chou would 
have been entitled to a portion of the profits that Dr. Roizman had received.220 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that Dr. Roizman had a fiduciary duty to his 
student with regards to giving her credit as co-inventor on the patent 
application.221 Although the case seems to have settled after the appeal so Dr. 
Chou's inventorship status was never adjucated, USPTO data indicates that 
"Correction oflnventorship Papers" were filed in September 2003222 along with 
an assignment by Joany Chou to ARCH Development.223 
These sorts of problems between faculty and non-faculty inventors can be 
viewed as power imbalances that affect the ability of the non-faculty inventor to 
negotiate inventorship credit and a share of the licensing revenue.224 Power 
imbalances are common in negotiations and are particularly prevalent in 
situations of employee negotiations with employer.225 This idea of power in 
negotiations can be defined as the ability to influence the decisions of the other 
party and can be determined by the relative dependencies of the parties on each 
other.226 The sources of this negotiating power are myriad and include individual 
characteristics such as charisma and negotiating skill, or situational characteristics 
such as relative positions within a company, i.e. a job applicant and a manager.227 
While courts have explicitly considered negotiation power imbalances in 
unconscionability and duress analyses in contract law, other applications are far 
216. !d. at 1353-54. 
217. !d. 
218. !d. at 1354. 
219. !d. at 1353. 
220. !d. 
221. !d. at 1362-63. 
222. Pair Database, Transaction History for Patent 5,328, 688, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair, archived at http://perma.cc/HU5S-SDT6 (last 
visited May 21, 2014). 
223. Patent Assignment Database for Patent 5,328,688, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignrnents, archived at http://perma.cc/8XWF-HA42 (last 
visited May 21, 2014). 
224. For a detailed review of power imbalances in negotiation and legal contracts, see Daniel 
D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. CoLO. LAW. REv. 139, 146-47 (2005). 
225. See Rebecca J. Wolfe & Kathleen L. McGinn, Perceived Relative Power and Its 
Influence on Negotiation, 14 GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 3, 5 (2005). 
226. See id.; Barnhizer, supra note 224, at 159. 
227. See id. at 166-68; Wolfe & McGinn, supra note 225, at 4-5. 
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more subtle and difficult to analyze.228 
While no real research has been conducted on the exact situation of non-
faculty researchers bargaining over invention credit and incentive share with 
faculty researchers, general research on power imbalances in negotiations can be 
revealing.229 Power imbalances exist in most relationships and are particularly 
evident in employment situations, though the extent of imbalance depends on 
numerous factors. 230 A low-skill factory worker may have little power in 
comparison to a factory manager as the worker is likely seen as easily 
replaceable: however, a highly skilled worker in a tight labor market has 
considerably more power in her relationship with her manager. 231 
In negotiations between faculty researchers and those non-faculty researchers 
working in their laboratories, this power imbalance is often exacerbated. More 
so than in many employment situations, the faculty researcher holds a great deal 
of power over the future career prospects of post-doctoral fellows and students 
in their laboratories.232 Due to the apprentice-like structure of graduate science 
programs, the faculty member controls degree prospects of students and 
publishing abilities of both students and post-doctoral fellows.233 For the non-
faculty researcher, this relationship makes bargaining for inventorship credit and 
splits of revenue problematic as the faulty member has a great amount of 
perceived power over the non-faculty researcher. This extreme, perceived power 
imbalance may result in the avoidance of conflict and lack of disclosure by non-
faculty researchers. 
Negotiations can be seen as two distinct types, distributive or integrative, but 
many real world negotiations will have aspects of both types.234 Distributive 
negotiations are characterized by a fixed outcome range in which both parties 
value the available resource equally, with the differences in outcome being which 
party leaves the negotiation with the majority of the resource.235 Distributive 
228. Barnhizer, supra note 224, at 146-47. 
229. Wolfe & McGinn, supra note 225, at 4. 
230. !d. at I. 
231. !d. at 4-5. 
232. Herman Aguinis eta!., Power Bases of Faculty Supervisors and Educational Outcomes 
for Graduate Students, 67 J. HIGHER Eouc. 267, 268 (1996). 
233. !d. 
234. Bruce Barry & Raymond A. Friedman, Bargainer Characteristics in Distributive and 
Integrative Negotiation, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 345, 348 (1998). For detailed 
discussions of distributive and integrative bargaining, see, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, 
GETI!NG TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIV!NG IN (1981) (in which the authors 
describe a "principled negotiation" method that focuses on the integrative bargaining characteristic 
of searching for ways to create value in a negotiation); DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE 
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGA!N!NG FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (The Free 
Press 1986); RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR 
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (Cornell University Press 1991 ). 
235. Barry & Friedman, supra note 234, at 346; Sidharth Thakur & Jean Scheid, Comparing 
Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Strategies, BRIGHT HUB PM (Apr. 15, 20 II), http://www. 
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negotiations are zero-sum negotiations, often involving money, a resource equally 
valued by each side.236 Integrative negotiation occurs when the parties are able 
to produce a greater outcome range by cooperating and sharing information than 
would be evident on the surface and is characterized by a problem solving 
approach by the participants237In integrative bargaining situations, there is often 
an ongoing or desired future relationship of the parties.238 
At first glance, a negotiation between a faculty inventor and student inventor 
over which party gets how much of the incoming revenue from a patent license 
would appear to be strictly distributive, as there is a fixed amount of licensing 
revenue involved. However, because the parties are likely to have an ongoing 
relationship if the student or post-doctoral fellow continues to work in the 
principle investigator's laboratory, integrative bargaining may be possible. 
Unfortunately, integrative bargaining can be time and resource intensive, and 
the skills required for successful integrative bargaining are not intuitive. 239 Many 
studies suggest that more integrative outcomes, i.e. outcomes with higher joint 
gains, result more often in situations where power distribution in the negotiation 
is equal than where power is unequal. 240 Some studies, however, demonstrate that 
integrative outcomes are indeed possible in situations of power imbalance but 
require the lower power negotiator to push for a cooperative solution.241 This 
would require negotiation skill and, perhaps more importantly for this discussion, 
a willingness to face overt conflict with the higher-powered party-neither of 
which the non-faculty inventor is likely to have.242 
A recent case also illustrates the potential power imbalance inherent in the 
laboratory structure. Frederic A. Stern sued Columbia University to be added as 
an inventor on a patent flied after he left the laboratory of Dr. Lazlo Bito.243 The 
Federal Circuit upheld the district court's opinion that Stern failed to produce 
sufficient evidence of inventorship.244 Although the Federal Circuit mentioned 
that unwitnessed laboratory notebooks would not have been sufficient alone to 
brighthubpm.com/methods-strategies/114091-comparing-distributive-and-integrative-negotiation-
strategies/, archived at http://perma.ccNQ4K-PDDP. 
236. !d. 
237. Barry & Friedman, supra note 234, at 348, 357. 
238. Thakur & Scheid, supra note 235. 
239. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 
1324 (2008). 
240. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, Power Imbalance and the Pattern 
of Exchange in Dyadic Negotiation, 2 GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 119 (1993); Leigh 
McAlister eta!., Power and Goal Setting in Channel Negotiations, 23 J. OF MARKETING REs. 238 
(1986); J.P. Sheposh, & P. S. Gallo, Asymmetry of Payoff Structure and Cooperative Behavior in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 312 (1973); Wolfe & McGinn, supra note 
225, at 5. 
241. See, e.g., Mannix &Neale, supra note 240, at 121. 
242. See id. 
243. Stem v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
244. !d. at 1378. 
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prove inventorship,245 Stem never had the chance to enter his laboratory 
notebooks into evidence.246 Dr. Bito had destroyed them.247 While the outcome 
may not have changed if the laboratory notebooks had been offered into evidence, 
the control over and destruction of the laboratory notebooks by Dr. Bito is 
another example of the power that the principle investigator of a laboratory holds. 
2. University Policies Do Not Fully Account for Non-Faculty lnventors.-
While the power imbalance plays a role in the involvement of non-faculty 
inventors in the technology transfer process, the university intellectual property 
(IP) policy also greatly impacts that involvement. Almost all university policies 
recognize that non-faculty researchers are potential inventors and provide for 
revenue sharing for that population.248 Unfortunately, universities do not 
recognize any differences in the incentives for faculty versus non-faculty 
researchers, nor do they recognize the power imbalance between the two 
populations. 249 
University intellectual property policies often give little attention to the 
potential problems inherent in multiple inventor situations. For example, the 
policy of the University of Illinois, a large research university, indicates that in 
the case of multiple inventor innovations, the innovators should split the royalty 
allotment given as incentives to the inventor(s).250 The proportions are left for the 
inventors to work out themselves. Alternatively, Washington University in St. 
Louis, another major research university, uses the presumption that co-inventors 
split licensing revenue shares equally but leaves open the availability of an 
agreement to a different revenue split between co-inventors.251 As a result, the 
principal investigator may demand a larger share of the revenue split. Most 
policies do have a dispute resolution provision, but this still requires that the 
laboratory worker be willing to risk dispute with their principal investigator.252 
245. /d. (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
1986)). 
246. /d. 
24 7. /d. Defendants claimed the notebook was destroyed when Dr. Bito retired. Stem v. Trs. 
of Columbia Univ., No. 01 CIV 10086RCC2005 WL 398495, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005), 
aff'd, Stern, 434 F.3d 1375. 
248. See General Rules Concerning University Organization and Procedure: Article Ill. 
Intellectual Property, UNIV. OF ILL., http://www.bot.uillinois.edu/sites/bot.uillinois.edu!files/bot-
files/General-Rules-1-24-13.pdf, archived at http://perrna.cc/5HHU-MKFL (last visited May 21, 
2014) [hereinafter U Illinois IP Policy]; Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48. 
249. See U Illinois IP Policy, supra note 248; Wash U /P Policy, supra note 48. 
250. U Illinois IP Policy, supra note 248 ("If there are joint creators, the net income shall be 
divided among them as they shall mutually agree. Should the creators fail to agree mutually on a 
decision, the University shall determine the division."). 
251. See Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48 ("If there is more than one Creator, each receives 
an equal portion ofthe Creator's Share, unless co-Creators agree to a different distribution."). 
252. Washington University in St. Louis, for instance, includes a rather common outline for 
dispute resolution among inventors. It reads: 
Any disputed issues related to intellectual property, or the interpretation of the 
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While university IP policies cover all inventors on the surface, the policies 
do not address the difference among the types of inventors, but rather treat all 
inventors as though they have similar motivations and pressures. For instance, 
non-faculty inventors likely will be indifferent to some incentives directed to 
faculty inventors. Moreover, the university policies fail to address the power 
imbalance inherent in the faculty/graduate-student relationship and its impact on 
the co-inventor relationship. 
Even though non-faculty researchers are included in the inventor revenue-
sharing provisions of the university IP policies, those provisions may still have 
greater benefits for the faculty co-inventors. University IP policies often direct 
a portion of the licensing revenue to the inventor's laboratory.253 Once the money 
is directed to the laboratory, the principle investigator is in charge of 
disbursement of the funds for research.254 Unless use of the funds by a graduate 
student or post-doctoral fellow co-inventor was specifically negotiated in 
advance/55 the co-inventor may never see the extra funds funneled to her project. 
In addition, the funds may not materialize until after the co-inventor has left the 
laboratory?56 Graduate students in science average five to seven years in 
laboratory research spent toward the Ph.D.257 Post-doctoral fellows are often 
limited to a set number of years through funding mechanisms.258 Patent licenses, 
Washington University Intellectual Property Policy, shall first be reviewed by the OTM. 
Any disputed issues that cannot be resolved with the assistance of the OTM shall be 
referred to the Vice Chancellor for Research. The Vice Chancellor for Research may 
refer disputed issues to a Faculty Oversight Committee on Technology Transfer for its 
recommendations and advice. The Vice Chancellor for Research is the final arbiter of 
any disputed issues related to intellectual property, income distribution or the 
interpretation of the Policy. 
Wash U IP Policy, supra note 48. 
253. See U Illinois IP Policy, supra note 248; U Wash IP Policy, supra note 48. 
254. For example, in defining the term Laboratory and Laboratory Share in its technology 
transfer policy, the University of Chicago acknowledges that the laboratory is "supervised by a 
Principal Investigator who may or may not be an INVENTOR." The University of Chicago 
License Revenue Sharing Policy, http:/ /tech. uchicago.edu/docs/revenue _distribution _policy. pdf 
(last visited June 9, 2014). 
255. Such negotiation for use of laboratory funds would also involve the power imbalance 
discussed above. See Aguinis et al., supra note 232, at 268. 
256. Inventors who leave the university may continue to receive individual portions of the 
revenue sharing, but the laboratory share is often defined as the laboratory where the research took 
place and thus stays with the university. The University of Chicago License Revenue Sharing 
Policy ,supra note 254. 
257. Jessica Stoller-Conrad, The 5-Year PhD: An Endangered Species?, FIGURE ONE (Jan. 
22, 20 13 ), http:/ /figureoneblog. wordpress.corn/20 13/0 1122/the-5-year-phd-an-endangered-species/ 
archived at http://perma.cc/5W9E-GD6R. 
258. For example, "[t]he Kirschstein-NRSA for Individual Predoctoral Fellows will provide 
up to five years of support for research training which leads to the PhD or equivalent research 
degree." Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Awards for Individual Predoctoral 
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especially ones negotiated with small start-up companies, may not bear revenue 
for several years after execution.259 Assuming that the invention takes some 
amount of time to create, disclose and negotiate a license, a non-faculty co-
inventor may have moved to the next stage of her career before that money would 
return to the laboratory. 
In addition, the university IP policies do not give specific attention to 
situations in which one inventor, such as a graduate student, may work in the 
laboratory of another inventor, such as a faculty researcher. Instead, most 
policies leave it to the inventors to divide the licensing revenue share among all 
co-inventors, either initially or in lieu of a default equal split.260 In either 
situation, the graduate student would be in an extremely weak bargaining 
position. 
As discussed above, the principal investigator of a laboratory wields 
considerable influence over a graduate stucient in the principal investigator's 
laboratory. To advance in her career, the primary need of a graduate student is 
to attain her Ph.D.261 In scientific academia, the Ph.D. is the key to the kingdom, 
giving access to the premier jobs in both industry and academia262 • Furthermore, 
to advance in their careers, graduate students need to publish their work and 
receive a recommendation from their principal investigator.263 Each of these 
potential levers adds to the power imbalance and makes it unlikely that a graduate 
student would challenge their principal investigator over inventorship or issues 
of allotment of any potentia/licensing revenue. 
Conflict with their principal investigator over unrealized inventorship credit 
and incentives may be considered by the student an unnecessary risk, with failure 
to disclose and abandonment of patent protection being the wiser choice. In the 
case of Joany Chou discussed above, Dr. Chou alleged that she was fired when 
she pressed her principle investigator to include her as an inventor on a specific 
patent.264 The tale ofPetr Taborsky is far worse. As an undergraduate student, 
MD!PhD and Other Dual Doctoral Degree Fellows (Parent F30), NAT'L lNST. FOR HEALTH, 
http://grantsl.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/P A-11-lll.html, archived at http://penna.cc/GNT6-
7ZF6 (last visited May 21, 2014). 
259. Yumiko Hamano, Commercialization Procedures: Licensing, Spin-offs and Start-ups, 
WORLD INTELLECTUALPROPERTY0RG. (20 II), http://www. wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/aspac/en/wipo _ 
ip_han_ll/wipo_ip_han_ll_ref_t7b.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/352H-JULL. 
260. See U Illinois IP Policy, supra note 248; U Wash IP Policy, supra note 48. 
261. The Disposable Academic, ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/17723223, archived at http://penna.cc/P5L3-3QV9. 
262. !d. 
263. Robert Bochnak, Graduate Student Guide to Publishing Your Research, TuFTs UNIV. 
GRADUATE SCH. FOR ARTS AND SCIENCES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://sites.tufts.edu/gradmatters/2012/ 
02/08/graduate-student-guide-to-publishing-your-research/, archived at http://perma.cc/RT76-
BZNK.("Publishing can help students land postdocs or tenure-track faculty positions, enhance the 
status of students in their field of study, and boost job prospects, especially in fields outside of 
academia."). 
264. See supra Part III.B.l. 
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Dr. Taborskf65 worked in Dr. Carnahan's laboratory at the University of South 
Florida conducting research on wastewater treatment.266 Both the university and 
Dr. Taborsky claimed ownership of his invention. 267 As a result of the dispute, 
the university filed criminal charges of theft of intellectual property,268 and Dr. 
Taborsky's United States citizenship application was put on hold.269 After trial 
and a refusal to sign his issued patents over to the university, 270 Dr. Taborsky was 
sentenced to three and a half years in prison, 271 two months of which was spent 
in a maximum security facility and involved work on a chain gang, and fifteen 
years ofprobation.272 Such a tale serves as an example of the power imbalance 
between the university system and students and a warning against students 
fighting for the ownership of their works. 
Therefore, an emphasis on creating more incentives directed toward faculty 
researchers will not similarly incentivize other inventors. In fact, more faculty 
incentives may exacerbate the problems that faculty have in acknowledging non-
faculty contributions. If universities wish to develop policies with incentives 
directed at all inventors, those policies must address the different perspectives and 
problems encountered by each. 
IV. BA YH-DOLE ACT AND TTO REFORM PROPOSALS SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR 
THE DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS OF THE POTENTIAL INVENTORS 
A. Current Proposals to Reform Bayh-Dole Act Generally Fail to Account 
for Non-Faculty Inventors 
In recent years, numerous authors have proposed reforms to correct perceived 
ills in the current academic technology transfer system.273 Only a few of these 
265. Dr. Taborsky went on to earn his Ph.D. in chemistry and is now an assistant professor at 
Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. See Mgr. Petr Taborskf, Ph.D., MASARYK UNIV., 
http://www.muni.cz/people/13423,archivedathttp://perma.cc/QDF4-BMA5(1astvisitedMay21, 
2014). 
266. Taborsky Case Study: Wastewater Treatment, IPADVOCATE.ORG (Jan. 6, 1989), 




269. Lisa Holewa, Patent Dispute Puts Scientist on Chain Gang, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 1996), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-07-07 /news/mn-21853 _l_chain-gang, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JH4R-UC9W. 
270. Based on his research, Dr. Taborsky was awarded patent numbers 5,082,813, 5,304365 
and 5,162,276. Inventor: Petr Taborsky, PATENTSTORM, http://www.patentstorm.us/inventors-
patents/Petr _ Taborsky/2315154/1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3636-WVN2 (last visited May 
21, 2014). 
271. Holewa, supra note 269. 
272. !d. 
273. For example, some authors have recommended that all university innovations should 
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proposals are directed, even in part, at the methods of incentivizing non-faculty 
academic researchers to disclose to the TTO and assist in the commercialization 
of their inventions. Some discussions go so far as to insist that such 
considerations are unnecessary. 274 
Some authors and courts have discussed the role of faculty researcher and 
members of their labs as a fiduciary relationship.275 A fiduciary duty places a 
burden on the faculty researcher to refrain from acting selfishly at the expense of 
members of her laboratory. Anthony Luppino has suggested that a solution to 
faculty/student ownership disputes is added emphasis and training of faculty 
members about their potential fiduciary duties.276 Unfortunately, this solution 
concentrates solely on faculty and ignores training of students and other 
laboratory members in their own rights and responsibilities, such as disclosure to 
the TTO. Luppino's solution further neglects to address the idea that there may 
be honest disagreement as to inventorship between faculty and non-faculty 
inventors. The complexity of patent law on inventorship and the lack of training 
make it difficult to believe that faculty members will always reach the correct 
solution, even if acting with complete openness and integrity. In the event of 
either an intentional or non-intentional fiduciary failure on the part of the faculty 
researcher, the laboratory member must still engage in open dispute with the 
faculty inventor, endangering their career prospects in the process. 
A proposal that has received much attention in recent years is that of 
eliminating TTOs and vesting full control and ownership of the patentable 
invention with the inventor. 277 The rationale is that the inventor best understands 
the invention and its potential, and therefore, the inventor is in the best position 
to exploit this potential.278 Supporters claim that this "Inventor-Ownership" 
proposal would reduce transaction costs, allowing the inventor control of the 
become public domain, as was accomplished by researchers developing the Human Genome 
Project. See Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1601 (20 1 0); Rebecca Goulding eta!., Alternative Intellectual Property for 
Genomics and the Activity of Technology Transfer Offices: Emerging Directions in Research, 16 
B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 194, 212-14 (2010). Other authors have proposed the use of only non-
exclusive licensing by TTOs. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1663 (1996); Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the 
Current University Invention Ownership Model, 38 REs. POL'Y 1407, 1417-18 (2009). 
274. See, e.g., James D. Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership of 
Federally Sponsored Research Patents, 49 IDEA 469, 497 (2009). 
275. See, e.g., Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F. 3d 1347, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Seymore, 
supra note 97, at 149-51. 
276. Luppino, supra note 97, at 424-25. 
277. For variations of this proposal, see, e.g., Clements, supra note 95; Martin Kenney & 
Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the Current University Invention Ownership 
Model, 38 REs. PoL'Y 1407, 1414 (2009); Robert E. Litan & Lesa Mitchell, A Faster Path from 
Lab to Market, Jan-Feb HARV. Bus. REv. 52 (2010). 
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process to continue commercial development herself or to license the invention. 279 
Some variations of the proposal suggest that the inventor could also choose a 
third-party agent for licensing purposes.280 
One outlier that does at least consider the role of non-faculty inventors is the 
American Association ofUniversity Professors (AAUP). The AAUP has recently 
issued final version of a report proposing sweeping new guidelines for the 
relationship between the university and faculty in response to an invention made 
using university resources or grants. 281 In many ways the report mirrors the 
Inventor-Ownership proposal in that it champions the faculty member's control 
and ownership of inventions created in her laboratory; however, the report does 
at least acknowledge non-faculty IP interests in limited ways. 
The AAUP proposal is set forth as a list of Principles for universities to 
follow in dealing with research. Principle Eleven champions the Inventor-
Ownership model and the "faculty member's fundamental rights to direct and 
control ... invention management, licensing, commercialization, dissemination 
and public use."282 Furthermore, the Principle 12 of the proposal encourages 
universities to use faculty senates to draft the procedures for technology transfer, 
giving the utmost control of such procedures to the faculty inventors.283 
Within this framework emphasizing the faculty ownership, the report does 
acknowledge non-faculty contributions. Principles 10 and 13 recommend that 
non-faculty researchers have access to grievance procedures if "they believe their 
inventor or other IP rights have been violated."284 The report further recommends 
that students not be required to give up IP rights as part of admission to a degree 
program.285 Finally, if there is a conflict of interest, including a financial conflict 
of interest, Principle 9 calls for impartial academic evaluation while Principles 8 
and 10 recommend disclosure of the conflict and a grievance procedure.286 
Even these references to student and non-faculty rights are not entirely 
without bias. While Principle 13 acknowledges that there will be disputes that 
need to be adjudicated, it charges the licensing agent to take into account the 
interests of the "faculty inventors," the institution and even the broader public.287 
Furthermore, the proposal advocates the faculty senate as the body to adjudicate 
disputes-certainly not a completely unbiased body as to inventorship disputes 
between faculty and students.288 The Inventor-Ownership proposal may indeed 
279. See Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the Current 
University Invention Ownership Model, 38 REs. POL'Y 1407, 1408 (2009) 
280. See, e.g., Litan, supra note 277. 
281. American Association of University Professors, Recommended Principles to Guide 
Academy-Industry Relationships (Univ. oflll. Press 2014) [hereinafter Recommended Principles]. 
282. !d. at 8. 
283. !d. 
284. !d. at 7, 9. 
285. !d. at 9. 
286. !d. at 7. 
287. !d. at 9. 
288. !d. 
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eliminate some impediments to disclosure, such as a distrust of the competency 
and motivations of the TTO, fear of TTO-imposed publication delays, and 
failures to disclose due to inadequate monetary incentive.289 However, the 
Inventor-Ownership proposal would not alter, and indeed may exacerbate, issues 
of failure to disclose or commercialize due to philosophical reasons related to 
communalism. 290 
The Inventor-Ownership proposal may also increase the conflicts developed 
in multiple-inventor situations. This would be particularly true when one of the 
inventors is a faculty researcher and others are non-faculty researchers. To the 
extent that the Inventor-Ownership model explicitly focuses on faculty inventor 
ownership, it does nothing to address the problems related to faculty inability to 
acknowledge non-faculty inventorship and may exacerbate the problem. Now the 
faculty and non-faculty inventor are not fighting over a split of small share of 
revenue but over ownership of the patent and all revenue associated with it. 
Some supporters of this Inventor-Ownership proposal have alluded to this issue. 
But they have not provided a resolution, preferring instead to proclaim that it 
would not actually increase the "exploitation of students."291 This notion is 
incorrect because discarding the TTO would remove the current primary 
possibility of a neutral arbitrator and educator of non-faculty researchers as to 
their rights and obligations in academic technology transfer. The AAUP report 
acknowledges disputes that need to be adjudicated but its primary adjucation 
body is the faculty senate. 292 
It is perhaps surprising that the AAUP, a group dedicated to faculty 
governance and composed primarily of faculty members, is the best promoter of 
the concept that faculty are not the sole inventors-especially in light of the fact 
that the other proposals discussed above are based upon mostly disinterested 
parties looking into the university system. However, the AAUP took input on a 
draft version of the report from numerous parties, some of whom were interested 
conflicts between students and faculty mentors.293 Therefore, based on the 
289. This assumes that the inventor will retain more licensing revenue share than is currently 
allotted. Some proposals have suggested that these rents could be divided between the inventor and 
the university. For example, Litan and Mitchell propose that faculty could choose their licensing 
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structure of the university research laboratory and the role of non-faculty 
researchers in the inventive endeavor, it is unclear as to why the discussion is 
only framed around faculty interests. 
B. A Modest Proposal 
1. Education.-Academic researchers are often woefully under-educated 
regarding issues surrounding invention and the duty to disclose. To encourage 
disclosure by non-faculty researchers, the TTO should take an active role in 
educating non-faculty and faculty researchers about incentives to disclose and 
about each group's rights as inventors or co-inventors. Obviously, a non-faculty 
inventor must fully understand her rights in order to advocate for herself. But 
faculty education can also enhance non-faculty participation. Although a faculty 
member's knowledge of the patent system's requirements in regards to 
inventorship will not change the perceived power imbalance in negotiations, the 
faculty member who understands inventorship may enter the negotiations with a 
better attitude toward non-faculty contributions to inventorship. Additionally, 
education regarding very basic patent issues such as the definition of inventor and 
invention, as well as the consequences of failure to name inventors, would clarify 
who should be named in a disclosure, making it easier to comply with TTO 
obligations. 
Not only would this education improve the ability to comply on a practical 
basis and increase awareness of incentives, education also combats the entrenched 
social norms against technology transfer generally. Once a principal investigator 
buys into the concept of invention disclosure and commercialization, other 
members of the laboratory, especially graduate students, become far more 
accepting of the concept. 294 Education of graduate students and post-doctoral 
fellows trains the next generation of faculty members in their rights and 
responsibilities as to technology transfer. 
2. University Policy Proposal.-In addition to education, universities should 
put in place clear guidelines in the IP policies that recognize the possibility of 
non-faculty inventors. These policies should address the power imbalance 
between non-faculty and faculty co-inventors. They might also develop different 
monetary incentives for non-faculty researcher disclosure. 
One such proposal would task the TTO with the responsibility of actively 
investigating inventorship of those disclosures involving a non-faculty member 
of a research group or laboratory upon the decision to proceed to the patent-filing 
step. Doing so would help protect the university from potential non-joinder 
issues,295 as well as relieve some of the burden from non-faculty inventors to 
dispute inventorship. The TTO could ask for the disclosure to contain a narrative 
(Bernard Lo et al. eds., 2009). 
294. Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Organization Change 
at the Individual Level, 19 ORG. SCI. 69, 84-86 (2008). 
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of how the research proceeded, including the identity of any person associated 
with the research. Inventorship could then be determined by the patent attorney 
prosecuting the patent.296 Patent prosecutors have a duty of candor to the 
USPT0.297 They are aware of issues that could arise should an inventor come 
forward later so are unlikely to omit inventors given correct information. 
Although patent ownership is equally divided among all inventors, not every 
inventor makes the same contribution to the conception of the invention. It is 
reasonable to assume that the inventor who conceives of a piece of the invention 
present in only one claim out of forty may receive a smaller share of the revenue 
than her co-inventor. Thus, the rules for determining how the revenue should be 
split are likely to be more complex than determining inventorship. 
The default rule for division of licensing revenues between co-inventors 
should be equal division between all inventors. While this default could be 
protested by any of the inventors, it would set a baseline rule that would give a 
greater bargaining position to non-faculty inventors. If an inventor wanted to 
protest the equal division of licensing revenue, policies should be in place for 
either mediation or arbitration procedure. 
Mediation would not alleviate the unequal bargaining power of the non-
faculty member. However, a mediator specially trained in integrative mediation 
could help the parties find a solution where both parties could be satisfied. For 
instance, although the faculty inventor might feel she deserved a larger share of 
revenue, she might be willing to divert any of the revenue returned to the 
laboratory to the non-faculty inventor's project. Extra research money might 
enable the non-faculty inventor to finish his project faster, travel to conferences, 
or receive specialized training, which might be worth the reduced share of 
revenue. 
Arbitration would more directly alleviate power imbalance between the two 
parties, though it would not cure it. The non-faculty inventor would still need to 
challenge the faculty inventor's request for more revenue, but the final 
apportionment would be based on the university invention disclosure detailing the 
invention process as well as any testimony. Parties undergoing arbitration would 
be less likely to find an integrative solution to the revenue problem but should be 
happy with an equitable split of the inventor revenue. 
The identity of this arbitrator or mediator is also problematic. As noted 
above, the faculty senate would not be a good source due to the faculty's bias 
against non-faculty inventors. The TTO could be a source for a neutral third 
party because the university administration should be interested in making the 
technology transfer process run in such a way that all parties have incentives to 
take part. Therefore, the desire for a reputation for fairness might make the TTO 
a good source for the neutral third party. However, pushing against that 
reputational pressure would be faculty pressure. If the TTO perceives the faculty 
296. For example, the University ofCalifomia system disclosure form specifies that the patent 
attorney prosecuting the patent will make final determination of inventorship. Disclosing an 
Invention, supra note 49. 
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inventors as repeat customers with whom the TTO hopes to do business on 
multiple occasions, it is possible the TTO might not be as unbiased as originally 
deemed. Therefore, the neutral third party should not be affiliated with the 
university in any way. 
Finally, universities should feel free to experiment with policies that are 
directed at non-faculty inventors. Perhaps direct monetary incentives for the 
disclosure itself would be more successful than the small, future possibility of 
licensing revenue. Of course, policies would have to be put in place to make sure 
the TTO did not waste resources on half-baked ideas submitted solely for the 
disclosure reward. On a more extreme scale, perhaps the portion of the revenue 
to the laboratory could be split among the individual inventors, even if the 
graduate student or post-doctoral fellow moved to another university. In 
academic hiring, the ability to bring in money for research is often key because 
faculty without funding cannot conduct research nor get publications.298 
Therefore, a new faculty hire with start-up funds from a past patent might have 
the advantage. 
CONCLUSION 
University research is at heart a collaborative endeavor. Scientific papers 
have multiple authors, often from different departments or laboratories. 
Similarly, inventions typically name several co-inventors. The myth of the lone 
inventor is dead. 
Unfortunately, this idea of the lone inventor still informs the education and 
policies surrounding university technology transfer. The Bayh-Dole Act requires 
incentives to be directed to university inventors in return for disclosure of 
inventions with university funds. For the vast majority of universities, those 
incentives are directed primarily at faculty inventors. To the extent that 
incentives are directed at faculty and non-faculty inventors, power imbalances 
impede non-faculty inventors from realizing the full benefit. 
The mismatch between incentives directed toward faculty and non-faculty 
inventors may account for some of the problems in the technology transfer 
system. Universities often suffer from low rates of disclosure due to time 
pressures on faculty and research social norms. Those rates could be elevated if 
more people in the invention stream were a part of the process. 
Universities would be well served to increase outreach to non-faculty 
inventors through a combination of education and policy changes. Education of 
faculty combats social norms that push against technology transfer generally as 
well as non-faculty inventorship. Non-faculty education encourages participation 
in the technology transfer process and empowers the non-faculty inventor to 
advocate for her rights. Technology transfer policies should then support that 
education. With a little effort, technology transfer could become the same 
collaborative endeavor as the science that feeds it. 
298. See Carter-Johnson, supra note 41, at 478-80. 
